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Despite increasing scholarly interest in the relationship between social networks and 
collective action, there is still limited evidence on how networks matter at the global level in 
shaping collective action outcomes, and how these structures emerge in the first place. 
Consequently, this dissertation aims at addressing these relations within the context of collective 
action campaigns, and neighborhood level protest events that were identified using police 
records in Ankara, Turkey between 2006 and 2011.  
The analysis of inter-organizational alliance networks shows that political opportunity 
structure related factors such as presence or absence of elite allies, relative openness or closeness 
of the institutional environment, still matter the most in understanding why some movements 
succeed while others don't in realizing their stated policy outcomes in semi-democratic settings. 
Different network structures have consequences only when political environment is conducive 
for successful outcomes.  
With regard to explaining tie strength, certain homophily mechanisms such as operating 
at the same level of jurisdiction and specializing in similar issues areas seem to be most powerful 
in revealing why some organizations work intensively with each other while others don’t.  
At neighborhood level protest events, the form and nature of pre-existing social networks 
present  in the neighborhood appear to be highly associated with the outcome of the protest 
events. Spatial arrangements are found to be very influential in the construction of these existing 
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networks. Findings suggest that hierarchical information networks are effective in mobilizing 
large numbers of participants for protest events whereas presence or absence of strong ties are 
crucial for explaining why only certain protest groups tend to embrace high-risk, disruptive 
protest strategies. 
 Overall, findings of this study indicate that different network structures interact with 
contextual factors in complex ways, and that certain types of networks are conducive to 
successful policy outcomes in combination with specific causal factors in  particular contexts. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Consider a group of actors united by a common goal; does it matter if they organize in highly 
clustered subgroups vs. in one dense component? What kinds of factors and mechanisms explain 
the emergence of these different structures? Are these structures associated with the performance 
of the group in anyway? If so, through what kind of processes are the structures related to 
performance? What are the policy implications of such theoretical considerations for community 
organizers, social movements, and policy makers in general? These are some of the central 
questions that motivate this study within the context of collective action events in the developing 
world. 
 Most researchers trace back the study of social networks to Jacob L. Moreno's (1934) 
famous book, Who Shall Survive (e.g. Wasserman and Faust, 1994; and Degenne and Forsé, 
1999). Between 1932-38, at the New York State Training School for Girls in Hudson, New 
York, Moreno studied informal interactions and emotional currents among the residents of the 
school. Based on a sociometric analysis of the affection among the residents, Moreno re-assigned 
the girls to residential cottages. After the re-assignment, Moreno observed significant decrease in 
the number of runaways from the facility. He also became the first social scientist to analytically 
show that social structures in which individuals are embedded can be as powerful in shaping 
human behavior as individual attributes.  
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  It was probably the publication of Mark Granovetter’s (1973) Strength of Weak Ties, 
article1 at American Journal of Sociology that inspired most members of the social science 
community to start paying attention to the significance of social networks in understanding social 
phenomena. In his article, Granovetter argued that individuals embedded in a strong web of 
relations tend to receive mostly redundant information.  If A is connected to B and C, through 
strong ties2, then B and C are also likely to be well connected. Therefore A is likely to obtain 
similar information both from B and C. In contrast, A has more chances of receiving non-
redundant information through weak ties, through connections to individuals that act as bridges 
across communities. Granovetter empirically confirmed his argument by showing that most 
individuals in a random sample of job changers in a suburban Boston area in the early 1970s had 
found their jobs through weak ties.  
 More recently, implications of social networks are no longer a topic of interest confined 
within the walls of academia. Even a cursory look at recent news stories in major media outlets 
reveals the fact that the significance of social networks is being recognized on a wide range of 
topics by practitioners and decision makers in public, private, and non-governmental 
organizations NGOs. A basic search on Google for news published between April 15th and May 
7th 2013 returns numerous articles on diverse topics such as consequences of social networks for 
black unemployment3, parents’ decision to vaccinate their children4, and spread of HIV5. 
1 At the time of writing this chapter, the Granovetter article was cited 24013 times, and remains  
the one of the most  influential social science articles of all times. 
2 Granovetter defines tie strength based on level of emotional intensity, amount of time, intimacy, 
and reciprocity pg. 1361. 
3http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/how-social-networks-drive-black-
unemployment/ 
4http://healthland.time.com/2013/04/15/how-social-networks-influence-a-parents-decision-to-
vaccinate/ 
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 The role of social networks in shaping social and political life came under the popular 
spotlight most recently during the protest events and regime changes in the Middle East and 
North African MENA countries following the self-immolation of a street vendor, Mohammed 
Bouazizi on December 17, 20106. The local demonstrations in Bouazizi’s town, Sidi Bouzid 
soon spread all over Tunisia, and to other MENA countries including Egypt, Yemen, Libya, 
Syria, Bahrain, Morocco, and Jordan7. The most notable outcomes so far of these uprisings in 
region has been the toppling of decades old authoritarian regimes in Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and 
Tunisia. Nonetheless, whether these regime changes will lead to democratic outcomes is still yet 
to be seen8. 
 Despite uncertainties and doubts regarding the future of Arab Uprisings, most scholars 
and analysts agree that social networks in social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and 
YouTube were instrumental in advancing regime change, especially in Egypt and Tunisia 
(Husain and Howard, 2013). One female activist in Egypt famously stated: We use Facebook to 
schedule the protests, Twitter to coordinate, and YouTube to tell the world.9  
More specifically, virtual networks in social media are claimed to contribute to 
revolutions in the Arab world by facilitating an alternative public sphere for activists to 
communicate and share information, by decreasing the transaction costs of organizing and 
coordination, and by increasing the cost of repression for the authoritarian states by enabling the 
5http://www.healthcanal.com/infections/38060-social-networks-may-help-slow-spread-of-
hiv.html 
6 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2044723,00.html 
7http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2011/mar/22/middle-east-protest-interactive-
timeline 
8http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/01/world/middleeast/turn-to-violence-across-middle-east-
raises-questions.html?_r=0 
9 http://www.psmag.com/politics/the-cascading-effects-of-the-arab-spring-28575/ 
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dissemination of dramatic images and videos beyond the borders of authoritarian states  (Lynch, 
2011; Howard 2011; and Howard and Hussain, 2011).  
On the contrary, skeptics of the relationship between social media and social change such 
as Evgeny Morozov (2011) and Malcolm Gladwell (2010) argue that the same networks used by 
the activists to communicate and coordinate can be easily turned into tools for identifying and 
suppressing activists by the authoritarian governments. The social media skeptics also claim that 
online activism does not directly convert into offline, street activism. More importantly, this 
group of researchers asserts that online activism can actually thwart social movements by 
creating a plethora of other distractions, and by promoting futile digital activism also known as 
slacktivism10 or clictivism.  
A recent empirical study shows that both arguments have merit to some extent (Tufekci 
and Wilson, 2012). Based on interviews with more than one thousand protestors in Tahrir Square 
during the climax of protests in January 2011, Tufekci and Wilson (2012) show that while almost 
half of the protestors were informed about the events through social media, these online 
networks were still mostly shaped by actual friends, family members, and acquaintances.  
Current examples on how networks matter in understanding social phenomena in 
different contexts can easily be extended (Scott and Carrington, 2011). Central to all these 
studies on the consequences of networks on outcomes of various issues are the explicit/implicit 
theoretical mechanisms that analytically link network characteristics with individual and group 
outcomes. 
 
10 http://neteffect.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/09/05/from_slacktivism_to_activism 
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1.1 NETWORK MECHANISMS AND OUTCOMES 
Regardless of the context of the study, whether it is social movements, policy networks, or intra-
organizational networks, there are four main mechanisms through which social networks may 
affect outcomes: (1) transmission, (2) adaptation to changing contexts, (3) binding participants to 
shared beliefs, and (4) exclusion of dissent (Borgatti at al., 2009).  
1.1.1 Transmission 
The most obvious network mechanism is transmission. Network ties can be considered as “pipe 
lines” (Marin and Wellman, 2010, pg.2) through which both material and non-material elements 
are transmitted among actors that make up a networks. Whether it is flow of information, money, 
ideas, emotions, and norms and values, the transmission process may influence individuals’ 
behavior e.g. participation in a protest event. These micro-level processes in return are likely to 
shape macro level outcomes e.g. if a network structure enables distribution of information 
regarding a protest event among a large number of people, more people may turn out to the 
protest event.  
1.1.2 Adaptation to Changing Contexts 
The adaptation mechanism emphasizes how actors exposed to similar structures may display 
similar behavioral patterns (Borgatti et al. 2009; and Marin and Wellman, 2010). In other words, 
actors that have similar positions in a network are likely to be exposed to similar constraints and 
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opportunities, and consequently are likely to respond alike to the structure in which they are 
embedded (Marin and Wellman, 2010).  
For example consider a friendship network in a firm; if two actors/nodes11 have lots of 
colleagues who they think they are very good friends12, both employees may be less inclined to 
leave their jobs for another position. Whereas, other employees with no friends13, or with only 
one friend14 may tend to leave their jobs for another one more easily in comparison to highly 
central actors in the friendship network. In other words, nodes with many connections may 
behave similarly, and actors with no or only one connection may also act similarly in accordance 
with the adaptation mechanism. 
1.1.3 Binding Participants to Shared Beliefs 
Binding occurs in networks that are very well connected and not fragmented (Borgatti et al. 
2009). When there are a few absent ties among an ego’s alters15 also known as structural holes16 
actors in the network can communicate and coordinate better, therefore can act as one unit 
(Marin and Wellman, 2010). For example Granovetter (1973), (cited in Marin and Wellman, 
2010) argued that communities with less fragmented structures are more likely to successfully 
resist urban renewal projects due to higher levels of trust among actors and towards their leaders. 
11 Actors in a network are also called as nodes in network terminology.  
12 Both actors have high degree centrality, the number of connections/links one has in a network. 
13 Such actors are called as isolates in network terminology. 
14 Actors with only one connection are called as pendants in a network. 
15 An alter in network terminology means the immediate ties of an ego. 
16 Coined by Ronald Burt (1992) structural holes are disconnections and nonequivalencies among 
actors of a network. According to Burt, structural holes are sources of competitive advantage since they 
are opportunities for information access, referrals and control. Structural holes provide information and 
control benefits, and these benefits are multiplicative, they augment and depend on one another 
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1.1.4 Exclusion of Dissent/Competitors  
Exclusion mechanisms develop in competitive environments in which the formation of a tie 
between two actors occurs at the expense of ties with other actors (Borgatti et al., 2009). This 
mechanism is mostly observed in market like contexts such as business environments in which a 
company restricts a supplier to work only with itself, and excludes other companies from 
working with that supplier.  
 Among these four mechanisms, this study utilizes the transmission and binding 
mechanisms in theorizing and testing the relationship between overall network structure and 
collective action outcomes. The exclusion mechanism is more commonly observed in 
economistic / market related contexts. However, the civil society arena, the main context of this 
study, is mostly characterized by norms that promote binding types of mechanisms. Likewise, 
the adaptation mechanism is also less relevant because the adaptation mechanism predominantly 
has consequences at the individual level, whereas this study focuses on the global characteristics 
of social networks. The specific processes and contexts under which the binding and 
transmission mechanisms inform the theoretical framework will be discussed in coming sections.  
1.2 GLOBAL NETWORK STRUCTURE AND COLLECTIVE ACTION 
OUTCOMES: AN INCOMPLETE LAYER OF ANALYSIS 
There is no dearth of studies that investigate the relationship between collective action and 
network structure. Quite the reverse, it is highly unlikely to find any studies that ignore the role 
of social networks while analyzing collective action-related topics (Diani, 2011). Most of these 
 7 
studies explore different structures among inter-organizational or interpersonal networks without 
examining the consequences of these networks in relation to any outcomes. Or even more 
common in the literature are studies focusing on the consequences of network structure for 
individual actors, e.g. are actors who are more central also more powerful, more wealthy, and 
more informed?   
Probably the most studied aspect of social networks with regard to collective action is the 
determinants of differential participation (Diani 2004; Beyerlein and Andrews 2008; Passy and 
Guigni 2001; Lim 2008; della Porta 1988; Gould 1991, 2003; Schussman and Soule 2005; and 
Oliver, 1984). Following the work of Olson (1965) on the irrationality of participation in 
collective action due to the free rider problem17, there has been a mounting line of research on 
how social networks determine individuals’ decision to participate in collective action. The 
principal idea in these studies is the fact that individuals do not make decisions in isolation; the 
social networks in which they are embedded re-structure the costs and benefits of participation 
by disseminating emotions, ideas, and information (Melucci 1996; Passy and Guigni 2001; Diani 
2003; Goodwin and Jasper 2004). They also act as a means of social control and source of peer 
pressure for individuals  who are less likely to participate in the absence of social networks 
(Diani 2003; Passy 2003). 
What is missing in this flourishing line of research are studies that go beyond individual 
level analysis, and consider the properties of whole or global network structure18 in relation to 
17 The free rider problem stems from the rational conclusion that in many  instances the 
benefits of collective action outcomes cannot be restricted to the participants only. Especially in 
cases in which participation comes with high costs e.g. risk of police arrest in protest events in 
non-democratic settings, rational actors are likely to choose not to participate to avoid costs.  
18 From now on network topology, global network structure and whole network structure 
will be used inter-changeably. 
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collective action outcomes for the whole group of actors. As many prominent social network 
scholars have recently argued, there is still so much to be done at the whole network level, 
especially in relation to the macro level characteristics/performance of the groups under study 
(Provan, Fish, and Sydow, 2007; Siegel 2009; Borgatti et al. 2009; and Krackhardt, 2012).  
Networks come in many forms and structures and we still know very little about how 
these network structures are associated with outcomes at the macro level (Siegel, 2009). Social 
networks that have the same size, or number of actors, and the same density, or number of ties 
among actors, can be substantially different from each other. 
 
Figure 1. Networks with a Similar Number of Actors and Ties, but Different Structures 
 
For example, the two hypothetical networks displayed in Figure 1 have the same size, and 
almost the same density, but the distributions of nodes and links are significantly different from 
each other.  Network A has multiple central actors that have many ties amongst each other as 
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well some ties to mostly pendants, actors that are connected to the network only through one tie.  
Network B in contrast,  consists of multiple dense subgroups that have very few ties among each 
other.  
What are the consequences of having these different structures? Which one would be 
more efficient in disseminating information? Obviously transmission of information would 
progress faster in network A in comparison to B, because network A has a much smaller 
diameter, the longest possible path between two actors, in comparison to network B. Even when 
the seed of the information is a pendant in network A, it would take at most three steps to reach 
to any other pendant actors. Because each pendant is linked to a central actor, and central actors 
are all connected to each other, when a pendant wants to reach to the furthest pendant, the 
information needs to pass through only two central actors at most.  
 In contrast, in the network B, the information travels much slower, because each 
subgroup has only two actors or less that have ties to the outside group, and each of these actors 
has ties to only one another subgroup. Therefore in order for the information to travel, it first 
needs to reach an actor in the group that has connections to the outside world. This transaction 
can take up to three steps, and then may have to travel to the next subgroup via a few ties also in 
order to reach to the next bridging actor.  
As the above illustration shows, the global structure of a network has crucial implications 
for the overall network; the fast spread of information may be crucial to mobilize large numbers 
of people for spontaneous collective action events, which in return may determine the policy 
outcome of that collective action.  Consequently, the main goal of this dissertation is to address a 
mostly neglected layer of analysis: the relationship between the whole structure of collective 
action networks and their outcomes by empirically examining the associations reflected in the 
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global network structure of 31 collective action events from Ankara, Turkey. As will be 
discussed in more detail in the forthcoming chapters, I hypothesize that certain global network 
structures are associated with successful outcomes because they either facilitate efficient flow of 
information, resources, and are resilient to disruptions transmission mechanism, or affect 
propensity for risky behavior by having dense structures binding mechanism.  
These network structures are entangled with other causal conditions as highlighted in the 
social movement literature. As will be discussed shortly in the forthcoming chapter, meaningful 
theoretical contributions are attained when network structures are examined in conjunction with 
other causal conditions emphasized by political opportunity structure, resource mobilization, and 
framing approaches. Therefore, other important causal conditions are also considered in the 
analysis by utilizing Qualitative Comparative Analysis QCA to compare the network structure 
underlying multiple collective action cases. 
1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The main goal of this study is decipher the relationship between the network structure of 
collective action events and their policy outcomes. The two main research questions that guide 
the study can be stated as (1) what types of network structures are conducive for successful 
collective action outcomes? And (2) how do these network structures interact with political 
opportunity structures, mobilization strategies, and cultural frames? While such questions have 
been explored using simulation studies, empirical investigation of networks in comparative 
perspective has been very rare. By using a small/medium N data set, this study will contribute to 
the empirical evidence on performance of networks. 
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 In addition to these, secondary research objectives are as follows: 
 
(1) Although there has been considerable progress in explaining the dynamics of social 
movements in the last decades, most of the empirical evidence represents cases that 
discuss the role of social movements in shaping public policies in Western democracies  
(Almedia, 2003; Tufekci and Wilson 2012; and Burstein, 1999). By focusing on a group 
of collective action event cases based in Ankara, Turkey between 2006 and 2011, this 
study aims at developing an understanding of social networks and collective action 
outcomes in semi-democratic cases.  
While Turkey fares relatively well in overall democracy ratings in comparison to 
other majority Muslim countries, civil rights are in decline as displayed by increasing 
police brutality against protestors, and by the numbers of journalists, lawyers, scholars, 
students, and activists detained for long periods of time without trial19.  Therefore, 
studying urban movements in Turkey will also likely shed some light on the social 
movements in semi-democratic settings. 
 
(2) Moreover, despite extensive literature on democracy and social movements in Turkey at 
the national level since the 1990s, there has been limited focus on urban movements and 
neighborhood protests with the exception of a few studies of resistance movements 
against urban renewal projects in large cities such Istanbul and Ankara (Bayraktar, 
19 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2013 - Turkey, 23 April 2013, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/5180c8f414.html [accessed 13 May 2013] 
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2007). Consequently, this study also aims at contributing to the literature on urban 
movements, and neighborhood level struggles in Turkey. 
 
(3) On a more methodological front, by combining QCA related techniques with social 
network analysis, this study seeks to contribute to the growing literature on mixed-
method approaches in the study of collective action. 
 
(4) Finally, the policy implications of this study, as highlighted in the concluding chapter, 
aim at providing community organizers and activists with novel ways of thinking about 
organizational strategies. 
 
1.4 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTERS 
Overall, this dissertation consists of seven chapters. The introductory chapter presents the main 
research questions of the study as well as the theoretical and policy oriented research objectives 
of the analysis. The second chapter first reviews the main theoretical approaches used in 
explaining social movement outcomes: resource mobilization, political opportunity structure 
framework, and framing and cultural theories. Next, this chapter focuses on the literature 
concerning the relationship between social networks and collective action in general, and the role 
of network structure in shaping collective action outcomes in particular. The main goal is to 
clarify the causal mechanisms through which network structure may affect collective action 
outcomes. A discussion on the conceptualization of social change is also provided using 
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Complexity Theory. Moreover, characteristics of the ideal types of network structures are 
introduced with the research hypotheses, and a review of relevant literature. 
The third chapter provides the details of data sources, data collection procedures, and 
coding techniques. Description of the operationalizations of causal conditions and outcomes is 
left for the empirical chapters since each chapter focuses on a different data set. Chapter III also 
provides a short discussion of Qualitative Comparative Analysis QCA as a research approach, 
since two of the three empirical chapters utilize QCA. The second half of this chapter presents 
the case selection rationale and context of the study. Discussion of civil society, state of local 
governance, the role of European Union in promoting stronger local governments and 
democratic participation in local politics in Turkey in general are followed by the presentation of 
a short history as well as some socio-demographic characteristics of Ankara in comparison to 
Turkey. 
 Chapter IV analyzes fourteen urban movement cases from Ankara. The data used in this 
chapter are based on semi-structured interviews with activists, content analysis of local papers, 
and newsletters of the participating Social Movement Organizations. Using Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis, the analysis in Chapter IV primarily investigates the inter-organizational 
network structures of urban movements in Ankara between 2006 and 2011 in relation to their 
outcomes. After introducing the causal model and operationalizations, chapter IV continues with 
the presentation of the results. The findings of the analysis indicate that when combined with 
some other resource mobilization--related causal conditions, certain network structures are 
associated with positive movement outcomes. Causal conditions relating to political opportunity 
structures appear to be more influential determinants of successful movement outcomes.  
 14 
 Chapter V, the second empirical chapter, can be considered as an extension of the 
previous chapter. In this chapter, the inter-organizational networks of each movement analyzed 
in chapter IV are aggregated into one large inter-organizational network of social movements in 
Ankara. Since many organizations are involved in more than one movement, the merger of inter-
organizational networks of separate movements generates a large, inter- connected network, 
except a few isolates and isolated dyads. The goal of this chapter is to investigate the larger inter-
organizational landscape in Ankara. The analysis starts with the identification of the most 
influential actors using multiple centrality score analyses and some basic network parameters. 
Next, using the theoretical framework for urban movements as outlined by urban sociologist 
Manuel Castells, the overall network structure is analyzed based on global network measures. 
Finally, in order to understand the determinants of tie formation among the SMOS, a multiple 
regression quadratic assignment procedure (MRQAP) is performed. Findings of the MRQAP 
analysis suggest that homophily and assortativity mechanisms are present in the process of tie 
formation. 
 The final empirical chapter, chapter VI, focuses on a group of inter-personal network 
based neighborhood level protests.  In accordance with the literature, the analysis in this chapter 
shows that most of the mobilization networks of the seventeen protest events under study are 
based on some form of pre-existing networks. After a short discussion of how different spatial 
arrangements interact and shape social relations at the neighborhood level, Chapter VI continues 
with a closer look at the two neighborhoods in which protests are observed more frequently than 
the other contexts and argues that, despite high levels of civic activism in both neighborhoods, 
the nature of ties reflects different types of social relations. The relationship between 
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mobilization networks and protest event outcomes are examined using Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis.  
Findings presented in chapter VI suggest that hierarchical networks are instrumental in 
mobilizing large numbers of participants for protests when certain spatial conditions are present. 
In addition, in protests events that are based on pre-existing networks dominated by strong ties, 
disruptive tactics are more likely to be used, and disruptive tactics are associated with successful 
outcomes under certain conditions.  
The final chapter, Chapter VII, first provides a summary of findings. Next, chapter VII 
presents a discussion of the limitations of the study in relation to internal validity and external 
validity. The last section outlines an agenda for future research. Possible research plans include 
the investigation of issues such as movement emergence in relation to pre-existing networks, 
interaction between online and offline network structures. Finally plans for examining the causal 
models identified in chapters IV and VI in different scales and context are discussed in this last 
section.  
 16 
2.0  EXPLAINING COLLECTIVE ACTION OUTCOMES 
The main challenges of studying outcomes of collective action include the difficulties in 
confirming that the relationship between action and outcome is not spurious, identifying the 
exact causal mechanisms that link actions and outcomes, and operationalizing and measuring 
specific outcomes, especially within the context of social movements20. While many researchers 
are drawn into studying social movements to decipher the processes that lead to meaningful 
social change, studies on outcomes are yet to be accumulated, mostly due to these challenges 
(Tarrow, 1998; Giugni, 1998; Amenta et al, 2010; Bosi and Uba, 2009; Andrew, 2001; Earl, 
2004; and McAdam and Snow, 2010).  
2.1 MULTITUDE OF OUTCOMES 
Social movements can have a wide range of consequences that are neither easy to identify nor to 
measure simply as success or failure (Amenta et al, 2010; Giugni, 1998; and Bosi and Uba, 
2009). 
20 Social movements can be considered as a subset of collective action that operates outside of 
institutional channels McAdam and Snow, 2010. As will be discussed in the next chapter on research 
design, not all cases under study perfectly fit to the definition of social movement. Therefore social 
movement and collective action are used interchangeably. 
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First, it may take years to decades to assess whether a movement was a success or failure 
(Giugni, 2008). For example the Kurdish movement that started in the early 1980s seems only 
recently, almost after 30 years of struggle21, to have achieved some degree of policy change 
(European Commission, 2006). 
Besides, movements may have abstract or very complex goals, and small gains or losses, 
in other words incremental changes, may have profound consequences in the long run (Gupta, 
2009; and Hasso, 2001). Therefore short-term and long-term consequences of movements need 
to be considered separately (Jenkins, 1982). Moreover, sometimes the unintended consequences 
of movements can be much more formative than the goals formally stated by the movement 
leaders (Tilly, 1999, cited in Giugni, 2004).  
Movements may also have different kinds of effects on other movements, such as 
“influencing other movements’ frames, discourses, collective identity, goals, tactics, and 
organizational structure” (Whittier, 2004; pg. 532). In addition to these, stated goals of a 
movement may fail, but participation in the movement may have profound personal and 
biographical effects (Giugni, 2004). 
Another common form of unintended consequences of social movements is cultural 
changes such as changes in values, opinions, and/or emergence of new collective identities Earl, 
2004.  For example, in his analysis of the Occupy Wall Street OWS Movement, Gamson 22 
argues that OWS had a substantial impact on changing the nature of political discourse and the 
21 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/after-decades-of-war-can-the-
kurds-finally-find-peace-8605190.html 
22 http://mobilizingideas.wordpress.com/2012/01/02/cultural-outcomes-of-the-occupy-
movement/ 
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various spheres in which it is carried on, especially mass media, while policy and institutional 
impacts are yet to be seen.  
2.1.1 Addressing the Challenges of Studying Outcomes 
This study aims to address the challenges associated with studying outcomes by focusing on 
mechanisms, studying more than one case, and by selecting reactive mobilizations-claims of loss 
of political and/or economic resources (Tilly, 1978).  
 As Amenta et al. (2010) assert, Qualitative Comparative Analysis QCA is one of the a 
few techniques that enable researchers to elucidate different causal and combinational 
mechanisms that are associated with social movement outcomes. By using QCA, this study 
attempts to reveal multiple mechanisms that are at work in facilitating successful collective 
action outcomes.23 The risk of spurious causation is minimized by applying a comparative 
approach to study multiple events/networks, and also by considering all major causal factors 
associated with movement outcomes derived from predominant social movement theories in 
addition to network related causal conditions.  
 Finally, measurement and operationalization issues are addressed by selecting cases that 
have limited locus of change at the local level, and also are aimed at reversal of a policy 
decision. In the words of Snow et al. (1998) it is possible to call such collective action events 
“…the results of actual or threatened disruption of the quotidian-that is in the taken-for-granted 
routines of everyday life” (pg.26). Since the cases under study do not aim at larger, complex 
23 Further discussion of QCA and other data analysis techniques are provided in the next chapter 
that focuses on data collection and analysis procedures.  
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social changes24, and mostly focus on reversing policy decisions, it is relatively easier to label 
the policy outcomes of these cases as success or failure. The consequences of movements for 
each other are addressed to a certain extent by considering whether movements tend to form 
allies with other movements. However, biographical, cultural, and long-term consequences of the 
movements are still not captured with the current analysis.  
2.2 THEORIES REGARDING COLLECTIVE ACTION OUTCOMES 
The major theories that explain social movement outcomes are political opportunity structures, 
resource mobilization, and cultural and framing theories. In the past, these theories were seen as 
contradictory explanations of social movements. But more and more scholars recognize that they 
are rather complementary instead of being conflicting, since each focuses on an important aspect 
of social change (McAdam et al., 1996). The role of context, overarching structures, and 
institutions are emphasized in political opportunity structures--related theories; organizational 
strategies and resources are put under the spotlight by resource mobilization approaches; and the 
role of movement frames and shifts in values and public opinions are analyzed in detail by 
cultural theories.  
Network related explanations are usually considered to be a subcategory of resource 
mobilization approaches; but after a brief review of the dominant social movement theories, 
24 There was one such movement in the data set. The movement called Saltanata Son End the 
Sultanic Dominion mobilized before the mayoral elections in 2009 aimed at increasing rights to the city 
and to end the rule of I. Melih Gokcek, mayor of Ankara since 1994. The collective action events 
regarding this movement were  removed from the analysis to achieve coherence on movement goals.  
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complexity theory demonstrates (Urry, 2005) that networked approaches play a crucial role in 
connecting micro-level and macro level processes in understanding social change.  
2.2.1 Political Opportunity Structures 
Political opportunity structure (POS) theories25 are historically the most commonly utilized 
approach in studying social movements. POS approaches explain emergence, development, and 
outcomes of movements through shifts in political environment, and influences of variations in 
the structure of power relations and institutional arrangements (Tilly, 1978; Tarrow 1998; 
Kitschelt 1986; and Kriesi 2004). For example, Jenkins et al. (2003) explain the ebb and flow of 
African American protest activity between 1948 and 1997 using a POS approach and show that 
fluctuations in the protest activity in those years were a function of favorable opportunities such 
as Cold War policy constraints, strong northern Democratic allies, and divided governments. 
According to McAdam (1996, pg. 27), the main aspects of the political opportunity structure 
approaches can be summarized as: 
 
“-The relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system,  
- The presence or absence of elite allies, 
-The stability or instability of that wide set of elite alignments that typically 
undergird a polity,    
- The state’s capacity and propensity for repression”. 
 
25 Also commonly called political process theories, McAdam and Snow, (2010) 
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 The last two conditions identified by McAdam are not relevant for the cases under study 
because the cases analyzed are short lived, even spontaneous in many instances, and do not have 
a long life span to be influenced by oscillations in the institutional environment. Moreover, the 
city of Ankara, in which all the cases are based, has been governed by the same mayor for almost 
20 years now, and it is possible to claim that political opportunity structures at the city level have 
remained pretty much constant over these years.  
The 31 cases analyzed in the study have different claim makers, and this variation brings  
a degree of variation in the absence  or presence of allies across cases. Moreover, openness and 
closure of the system also varies across cases, due to the presence of different combinations of 
antagonists. Operationalizations of these constructs are discussed further in the empirical 
chapters. 
2.2.2 Framing Approaches 
Cultural and framing approaches started to emerge in the 1980s as a reaction to the lack of 
attention to the relationship between social movements and meanings mostly based on works of 
scholars such as David Snow and Robert Benford. Studies using a framing perspective 
conceptualize social movements as struggles over meanings and ideas produced by movement 
protagonists and antagonists. According to the framing perspective, movements can mobilize 
larger segments of the society, if they can challenge the dominant definitions of reality and 
meanings; provide alternative meanings; and frame contested issues in a way that will resonate 
with a large number of people and their emotions (Benford and Snow, 2000; Poletta and Jasper, 
2001; and Snow and McAdam, 2000).  
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The framing perspective also informs the selection of causal conditions in the empirical 
analyses sections, especially with regard to the perception and framing of the issues by the 
participants. Framing related causal conditions mostly focus on the level of urgency and 
significance of the demands as framed by the participants. 
2.2.3 Resource Mobilization Theories 
Resource mobilization theories emerged as a response to traditional social psychological 
explanations of social movements that emphasized grievances, personality, and alienation 
(Klandermans, 1984). Instead, the resource mobilization tradition in the study of social 
movements focuses on the role of organizational structure, material resources, and strategies 
utilized by activities for successful movement outcomes (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). The 
resources can range from material resources such as money, office space, and transportation to 
information and human resources. Unlike in social psychological approaches, in resource 
mobilization theories, individuals are rational actors that weigh the costs and benefits of 
participation (Oberschall, 1973; and Zald and McCarthy, 1979).  
A number of causal conditions are also derived from resource mobilization theories in the 
study such as number of participants, movement tactics and strategies, and measures of 
participants’ commitment. . 
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2.3 NETWORK STRUCTURE AND COLLECTIVE ACTION OUTCOMES 
The role of each theoretical approach discussed above is vital to understand the mechanisms that 
structure the collective action outcomes. However, the main focus of this study to understand the 
consequences of social networks for collective action. This type of question can be studied at 
different levels of analysis.  
Figure 2 briefly summarizes the most commonly used units of analyses in network 
studies26.  As levels of analysis increase, so do the data requirements for analysis (Knoke and 
Yang, 2008). For example, data needed for the first level of analysis, analysis of ego networks, 
can be considered as attribute data since information about the alters of an ego can easily be 
collected during randomized surveys. 
Collecting data for the fifth level, Cognitive Social Structures, is extremely difficult since 
it requires each actor in the network to answer questions about N2-N possible relations in the 
network. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26 It is also possible to study the effect of multiple levels at the same time e.g. Wang, et 
al., (2013); and (Snijders and Bosker, 2012).  
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Figure 2 Different Levels of Analyses in the Study of Networks 
 
 
 
Among these different levels of analyses, Level 4, whole or complete networks, is the 
main level of analysis of this study. According to Knoke and Young (2008), this level of analysis 
“is the most important macro level of analysis” (pg.14). As one of the leading scholars in 
network studies, Steven Strogatz (2001) argues, “network topography is important … because 
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structure always affects function” (pg. 268). Social networks may exist in a variety of structures, 
and this variation in the structure of social networks shapes collective action efforts in 
substantially different ways (Gould, 1993).  
Moreover comparative studies are more feasible at this level (Marsden, 1990), and only 
through comparative, or cross network studies, is it possible to make plausible causal claims 
about the relationship between network properties and group outcomes, whether it is a group of 
organizations, individuals, or countries.  
Likewise certain questions can be studied only by looking at the global structure of 
networks. As Provan et al. (2007) assert;  
 
“Only by examining the whole network can we understand such issues as how 
networks evolve, how they are governed, and, ultimately, how collective outcomes 
might be generated. This last point is especially relevant to policy planners and 
those having a perspective that goes beyond the performance of individual 
organizations… By focusing only on the members themselves and their interactions 
with others, however, the importance of individual organizations tends to be 
exaggerated and the importance of collective behavior underemphasized.” (pg. 
480.) 
 
With regard to collective action, the whole network level of analysis is especially crucial, 
because the mechanisms that are shown to be important in understanding collective action 
outcomes, such as the flow of information for coordination activities, spread of emotions, ideas, 
and values for recruitment activities as well as for movement strategies, and the resilience of the 
movement against disruption from the external environment, can all be considered as functions 
of variations in the global network structures.  
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But how do these social network structures emerge and evolve? The next section aims at 
providing a short discussion of the underlying assumptions of the study with regard to social 
change and also to shed some light on the dynamics of interaction between micro and macro 
levels of analysis using complexity theory and Gidden’s structuration theory. 
2.3.1 Social Networks, Complexity Theory, and Social Change: Theoretical Perspectives 
on Social Change 
Arguments about the relationship between network structures and collective action outcomes 
originate from assumptions about social change in general, and the relationship between actors/ 
agents and structures in particular.  
Two of the most comprehensive theories that explain the interaction between actors that 
make up a network and the structure of the network are Anthony Giddens’ structuration theory 
and complexity theory. According to Giddens' (1981) theory of structuration, agents in a social 
system act intentionally, but in return, the totality of the purposeful acts of the agents creates a 
structure that constrains the individual behaviors. The interaction between social agents and 
structure is a continuous process through which individual agents constantly shape and are being 
re-shaped by structures. In Giddens’ (1981) own words: 
 
“All human action is carried on by knowledgeable agents who both construct the social 
world through their action, but yet whose action is also conditioned and constrained by 
the very world of their creation” ( pg. 54). 
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Similarly, in complexity theory, social structures that make up a society are considered as 
open and dynamic systems that function within an external environment. Complex systems are 
continuously shaped by the actions of actors, and these actors’ behaviors are in turn constrained 
by the structural positions in which they find themselves (Cowan et al.1994; and Lewin, 1993). 
From a complexity theory perspective, social change is a result of constant interaction among 
agents. A pattern emerges that feeds back into the system, and re-structures the interactions of 
the agents.  
The concept of a network as used by social network scholars strongly resembles this 
systems thinking in complexity theory (Walby, 2003). Similar to networked approaches to 
collective action and social movements, systems in complexity theory carry collective properties 
that may not be implicit at the individual level (Urry, 2005), because these emergent global 
properties of systems are consequences of non-linear interactions among actors (Urry, 2005). In 
other words, focusing on the micro dynamics at the individual level is not sufficient to 
comprehend the macro level characteristics of systems (Urry, 2005). 
Therefore it is crucial to understand the global properties of networks and the types of 
relations between the agents rather than the agents themselves (Axelrod and Cohen, 1999). 
Overall, complexity theory emphasizes interaction, self-organization, and feedback loops to 
understand the dynamics of social change.  
The most common element in both theories of social change is a mutual and circular 
causality and the co-evolution of agency and structure without championing the primacy of 
either one. Both approaches recognize the power of agents while acknowledging the constraints 
imposed on them by the structures in which they operate; just like in the famous quotation from 
Marx (1852) “Men make their own history, but they do not make it under circumstances of their 
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own choosing”, (pg. 115). Consequently, complexity and structuration theories provide a 
balanced view to understand processes of social change that is neither overly structuralist, nor 
simply rational agent based.  
How do these theories inform the hypotheses of this study? First, the main explanatory 
variable of the study, social network structure, is essentially a function of the interactions of the 
organizations and individuals involved in the protest events that will be analyzed in the 
forthcoming chapters. The overall network structures are not pre-defined or imposed either by a 
leader or by external forces27. Instead, they emerge as a result of the self-organization of actors 
that get involved in the movement. The same network structures that stem from the actors’ 
interactions also restrain the processes of information exchange, coordination, and recruitment, 
which are shown to be significant at explaining the policy outcomes of collective action events. 
Moreover, the external environments in which these networks operate can hinder or facilitate 
effective collective action, as suggested by POS approaches. Finally, some actors in the network 
can function as norm entrepreneurs (Sunstein, 1996) that facilitate the transmission of new ideas 
and meanings that may have an effect on recruitment of participants as well as on the emergence 
of strong collective identities.  
This dissertation aims at grasping both these micro and macro processes by analyzing 
both antecedents and consequences of social networks in the following empirical chapters.  
27 These networks are obviously also constrained by external environments as argued in 
complexity theory. 
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2.4 TYPOLOGIES OF NETWORK STRUCTURES 
Anthropologist John Barnes (1972) once described the state of scholarship on graph theory as “a 
terminological jungle, in which any newcomer may plant a tree” (pg.54). After four decades 
since Barnes’ observation, it is still not possible to talk about a consensus among network 
scholars on a typology of social network structures.  
Increasingly, scholars emphasize the presence of various network structures. The specific 
disciplines or issues one studies also have an influence on the identification and labeling of 
various network structures. Figure 3 provides a summary of some of the network topologies 
identified by Frantz et al. (2009); Kearns, et al. (2006); Brede and Vries (2009); Ravasz and 
Barabasi (2003); Diani (2003); and Lamertz, (2009). The list of network structures is far from 
being comprehensive, but aims at providing a sample of structures that are most commonly 
addressed in the literature.  
The first network structure, random network, has been extensively studied since the 
groundbreaking studies of Erdös and Rényi (1959). The structure in random networks emerges 
completely as a result of random processes. However, as Ravasz and Barabasi (2003), indicate, 
“We learned that networks are far from being random, but are governed by strict organizing 
principles that generate systematic and measurable deviations from the topology predicted by the 
random graph theory of Erdös and Rényi” (p.67). 
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Figure 3 Network Typologies 
Network Type Network Characteristics 
Random Networks -Based on the work of Erdös and Rényi (1959). 
-Emerge as a result of random processes. 
-Not commonly observed in real world social networks. 
Star Networks Very basic network structures characterized by one node in 
the center that is connected to number of nodes that are not 
connected to each other.  
Small World Networks -Based on the works of Watts (1999); and Watts and 
Strogatz, (1998). 
-Defined by sub groups with high clustering and low 
average distance in comparison to random networks. 
Scale Free Networks -Based on the works of Barabasi et al. (1999); and 
Faloutsos et al. (1999). 
-Characterized by a few hubs, actors with lots of 
connections, and majority of nodes with only a few links to 
others power law distribution. 
Core-Periphery -Based on the works of Borgatti and Everett (2000). 
- A group of actors with large number of connections both 
among themselves and to the ones in the periphery, and 
groups of actors in the periphery that are weakly connected 
to each other and to the nodes at the center. 
Cellular Networks -Based on the works of Frantz and Carley (2005); and  
Tsvetovat and Carley (2005). 
-Sparsely connected, decentralized and non-hierarchical 
structures, social constructed, also known as dark networks, 
p terrorist networks.  
Hierarchical Networks -Based on the works of Krackhardt (1994) and Ravasz and 
Barabasi (2003). 
-Network hierarchies can be considered as an extended, 
iterative version of star networks. 
Policephalous Networks  -Based on Diani (2003). 
-Centralized and segmented structures  a few central actors, 
and large average distances among actors. 
Segmented/Decentralized 
Networks 
-Based on Diani (2003) 
-Decentralized and still segmented type of structure. 
 
Isolated Cliques -Based on Lamertz (2009). 
Similar to Diani’s segmented and decentralized networks, 
consist of groups of cliques and isolates of a fragmented 
network. 
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In other words, it is not possible to observe actual networks that perfectly resemble random 
networks; instead there is some kind of order and pattern in real life networks. As the Figure 3 
displays, network scholarship is still far away from agreeing on a typology of networks.   
However, most of these structures are defined based three main dimensions of networks: 
(1) Degree of centralization/hierarchy; (2) Level of segmentation/subgrouping; and (3) Average 
path length28. 
A recent influential paper by David A. Siegel (2009) entitled “Social Networks and 
Collective Action” provides a useful typology of network structure that considers these 
dimensions to a great extent within the context of collective action. The four main network 
structures suggested by Siegel (2009) are: (1) Small World Network; (2) Elite Networks; (3) 
Village Networks; and (4) Hierarchical networks. One shortcoming of this typology is the 
assumption that most networks in collective action will have at least 20 to 30 actors, since it is 
not realistic to expect the formation of complex networks such Small World Networks. 
Moreover, all these structures assume connected networks are not fragmented, whereas 
fragmented and sparse networks are common, especially among small scale urban or 
neighborhood level movements.  
Therefore, this study includes Isolated Clique network structure to consider sparse and 
fragmented mobilizations in addition to the typology suggested by Siegel (2009). The next 
section provides detailed illustrations of these network topographies before reviewing the 
literature on the performance of these structures within the context of collective action, and later 
situates the overarching hypotheses of this study within that literature.  
28 Arithmetic mean of number of steps in the shortest path between every possible pair of 
actors. 
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2.4.1 Isolated Clique Networks 
Isolated Clique networks resemble Diani’s (2003) segmented and decentralized networks. The 
most obvious characteristic of this type of networks is fragmentation of the network into multiple 
subgroups. According to Lamertz (2009), these types of networks suffer from inability to 
coordinate across communities. Moreover, Lamertz (2009) argues that subgroup identity and 
trust are likely to supersede identification with the overall network community. 
 
Figure 4 Isolated Cliques 
 
 
 
 
` More importantly, Lamertz (2009) suggests that networks that have a topography that 
resembles Isolated Clique networks are extremely vulnerable to inter-group conflict and 
disagreements. It is almost impossible to find empirical and theoretical scholarly studies on these 
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types of networks. Still, as the empirical chapters display, fragmented structures such as the 
Isolated Cliques are commonly observed, especially within the context of small-scale urban 
movements. 
2.4.2 Small World Networks 
Figure 5 Small World Networks 
 
 
It was mostly the work of Duncan Watts and Steven Strogatz (1998) that formalized the 
structural properties of Small World Networks. In their seminal paper published in Nature in 
1998, Watts and Strogatz identified two essential characteristics of Small World Networks in 
comparison to random networks: (1) presence of highly clustered subgroups; and (2) frequent 
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bridging connections among these subgroups. Consequently Watts and Strogatz (1998) defined 
Small World Networks as networks that have a high clustering coefficient29 and small average 
path length30 in comparison to random networks. This type of structure is commonly observed in 
cities and suggests that any two random actors are connected to each other by a short chain of 
actors, regardless of the size of the network.  
There is an increasing number of studies suggesting that Small World Networks are both 
efficient and robust because information and resources can travel between any given two actors 
at a very high speed, and removal of a bridging tie among subgroups may not affect the 
resilience of the overall structure since there  is a large number of ties that connect these dense 
subgroups (e.g. Latora and Marchiori, 2001).   
2.4.3 Village Networks 
Village networks are associated with high-density subgroups or clicks in which almost everyone 
is connected to one another. These types of structures resemble villages and small towns with 
high levels of social control (Siegel, 2009). There are very few actors that act as bridges between 
the groups. In comparison to Small World Networks, Village networks are more tightly clustered 
and likely to have larger average path length and are less efficient, because information or 
resources can travel across subgroups only through a few actors. According to Siegel (2009) both 
in Small World Networks and Village Networks, actors tend to have an equal number of 
connections. In that sense, both networks lack strong central actors. 
29Clustering coefficient of a network represents the mean ratio of the existing links 
between the alters, or directly connected agents, of a node and the total possible links between all 
agents for that network. 
30 Average geodesic shortest distance between two actors. 
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 Figure 6 Village Networks 
 
 
  
2.4.4 Elite Networks 
Opinion networks also known as core/periphery structure, (Borgatti and Everett 1999; 2000) are 
characterized by a group of actors with many ties among each other, and another group of 
peripheral actors that have very few or no ties among each other (Siegel, 2009). Actors in the 
periphery are connected to the network through their limited number of ties with one or a few 
actors in the core.  In Opinion networks, the core group has the capacity to mobilize and 
coordinate activities of the overall network while the actors in the peripheries do not have such 
capacities (Lamertz. 2009). 
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Figure 7 Elite Networks 
 
 
 
2.4.5 Hierarchical Networks  
Hierarchical networks are the most centralized type of network structures among the five 
typologies used in this study and closely resemble traditional bureaucratic structures that are 
characterized  by an increasing number of actors as one moves from the top of the hierarchy to 
the bottom. Formalized by Krackhardt (1994) in mostly stylized hierarchical networks, each 
individual is connected to one actor above, and multiple actors are connected to him from below. 
The rate of expansion determines the size of the network: for example, if the expansion rate is 4, 
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there is one node at the top, four people connected to that node at the second level, 16 at the third 
level (Siegel, 2009).  
 
Figure 8 Hierarchical Networks 
 
 
 
 
 Siegel (2009) considers Opinion Leader and Hierarchical networks as different forms of 
elite networks since each model is characterized by stark power inequality among actors in terms 
of the number of connections they have.  Both structures can be considered as more complex 
versions of a completely centralized star type of structure.  
 The next section reviews the empirical literature on the performance of these networks 
and develops some broad hypotheses about these structures within the context of collective 
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action. These hypotheses are later refined in empirical chapters to reflect differences between 
interpersonal and inter-organizational networks, as well as to consider the distinct external 
environments in which these networks operate.  
2.5 REVIEW OF SCHOLARLY WORKS ON COLLECTIVE ACTION OUTOMES 
AND NETWORK STRUCTURE 
Earlier studies analyzing the role of structure on collective action outcomes mostly focused on a 
single dimension of network characteristic: performance of centralized or decentralized 
networks. Analyses of more complex structures flourished mostly in the 1990s, following the 
groundbreaking work of Duncan Watts and Steven Strogatz (1998) on Small World Networks.  
The evidence on the relationship between network topography and collective action 
outcomes is still far from conclusive. Collective action outcomes are the result of complex, 
nonlinear interactions of a multitude of causal conditions. As Suh (2012) indicates, intricate 
causal mechanisms need to be considered to understand the variation in collective action 
outcomes, and due to this causal heterogeneity, it is not possible to single out a particular 
network structure that is associated with successful collective action outcomes.31 
In their comprehensive review of literature on research on the whole network level in 
comparative inter-organizational studies, Provan, Fish, and Sydow (2007) also show that 
network structure centralization vs. decentralized structures is still very contradictory. They 
31 As will be discussed shortly in the next chapter, Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
(QCA) is used as the main tool of analysis since QCA is mainly a technique developed Ragin, 
(1987) to capture such causal complex, nonlinear mechanisms. 
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observe that network properties interact with a multitude of other factors based on the context 
and the external environment of the cases being of studied. Similarly, in his influential 
simulation study, Gould (1993) shows that network structure parameters such as density and size 
have nonlinear relationships with collective action outcomes. Gould (1993) warns against 
simplistic generalizations about the relationship between network structure and collective action 
outcomes and highlights the importance of particular external environments that collective action 
events operate in: “ …it is risky to make generalizations about the impact of network structure in 
the absence of detailed information about [the] collective action setting” (pg. 195). Nevertheless, 
the majority of studies on the performance of centralized vs, decentralized structures conclude 
that centralized networks are more effective in managing information flow and coordination 
activities.  
William Gamson’s study, Strategy of Social Protest [1975] (1990) is probably the first 
crucial work analyzing the outcomes of social movements based on the organizational structure 
of the Social Movement Organizations SMOs.  Instead of studying the inter-organizational 
networks among SMOs, Gamson focused on the internal organization of 53 SMOs. Gamson’s 
analysis concluded that centralized and bureaucratic organizations are more likely to be 
successful because they were more effective at mobilizing resources by strict hierarchies. 
Moreover, Gamson (1990) argued that the bureaucratic and centralized structures were more 
efficient for timely decision making processes and worked better for reducing internal conflict, 
since the involvement of fewer people in the decision making processes facilitated the 
emergence of consensus more quickly than decentralized structures.  
A number of replication studies of Gamson’s data with more sophisticated techniques 
also produced similar findings, (e.g. Frey et al. 1992; and Mirowsky and Ross, 1981). Similarly, 
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in their third paper on the “Theory of the Critical Mass” series, Marwell and Oliver (1988) argue 
that centralized network structures combined with the presence of heterogeneous groups are 
more likely to mobilize larger numbers of people in comparison to decentralized structures.  
On the contrary, some scholars argued that decentralized structures are more effective at 
generating solidarity among participants and also more adaptive and resilient during times of 
crisis, because decentralized structures are less likely to dissolve as a result of a few disruptions 
in the network (Jenkins, 1983). 
 The debate on the performance of centralized vs. decentralized networks appears due to 
the fact that networks do not directly affect collective action outcomes. Instead network structure 
is, most of the time, associated with certain causal conditions that are directly affecting the 
collective action outcomes such as number of people mobilized, sustainability and resilience of 
the movement, and tactics/strategies used by the participants. Furthermore, these direct effects 
almost always interact with other significant causal conditions. Therefore more refined 
explanations on the relationship between network structure and collective action outcomes are 
needed.  
 For example, following the tradition of threshold models proposed by Granovetter 
(1978), and Schelling (1978), Chwe (1999) explains the variation in the number of participants 
as a function of the interaction between possible participants’ threshold levels, and the strength 
of ties32. Using simulation study, Chwe (1999) shows when the threshold to participate is high, 
weak ties work better since weak ties are more effective in spreading information to larger 
numbers of people. Strong ties are more effective in mobilizing people with low thresholds, 
32 Chwe (1999) conceptualizes a strong tie similar to transitivity, or highly clustered 
localized cliques in which if A is friend with B and C, the probability of B and C being friends in 
very high.  
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because through strong links, local knowledge among a few friends is formed quickly and the 
threshold for action is met faster. 
 An  influential study by Centola and Macy (2007) also challenges the effectiveness of the 
weak ties argument. Centola and Macy (2007) assert “Weak ties, ties that connect actors that are 
structurally distant from each other, are very powerful during dissemination of information, or 
contagious diseases. In the case of complex contagions, defined as spread of behaviors that are 
costly, risky, or controversial, the willingness to participate [in] independent affirmation or 
reinforcement from multiple sources…because successful transmission depends upon interaction 
with multiple carriers” (pg. 703).  Using a simulation study, Centola and Macy (2007) confirm 
that strong ties are crucial for participation in complex contagions such as high-risk social 
movements, and weak ties can actually be detrimental in such cases.  
 McAdam and Paulsen (1993) also recognize the trade-offs between strong and weak ties 
and argue that strong ties are crucial for recruitment, whereas weak ties have an important 
function in communicating the message of the movement among larger populations. Likewise, in 
his review of the role of strong and weak ties during collective action, Diani (2011) concludes 
that strong, bonding ties are imperative for recruitment purposes, but they may also lead to 
emergence of cleavages and limit mobilization of larger populations.  His review also determines 
that weak or bridging ties are instrumental for communication and coordination, but are not so 
effective for recruitment. Ahuja and Carley (1998) also show that centralized structures are 
efficient at communication and coordination. 
 Baldassari and Diani (2007) acknowledge the strength of centralized structures with weak 
ties for communication and coordination purposes, but they also claim that such network 
structures are not resilient because they are extremely sensitive to interruptions in the network, or 
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threats from the external environment. Moreover, they argue that high levels of power 
asymmetries characterize such networks and the absence of reciprocity among actors may be 
detrimental for the formation of a collective group identity that is crucial for the commitment of 
participants for a cause.  
Baldassari and Diani (2007) assert that polycentric structures characterized with more 
balanced dependencies and higher levels of reciprocity across actors are a better fit for a 
solidaristic model of collective action. Because they state that although the decision making 
processes are based on diffused agreement among actors in polycentric structures which tends to 
reduce effectiveness, such structures are more resilient to interruptions and external threats and 
are more conducive to the emergence of collective identity and solidarity.  
One of the most important additions to this literature on network topography and 
collective action outcomes is Siegel’s (2009) simulation study. In his study, Siegel works with 
the four main network structures that were discussed previously: Small World Networks, 
Hierarchical Networks, Core-Periphery Networks, and Village Networks.  Siegel assesses the 
performance of these networks at mobilizing high numbers of participants at different levels of 
motivation. Based on a simulation study, Siegel’s study yields the following testable hypotheses 
(pg. 136): 
Small World Networks: Since small world networks consist of both weak and strong 
ties, they are effective in both spreading information and recruiting participants. When 
motivations are high, increasing weak or/and strong ties also increases participation. In scenarios 
with fewer motivations, weak ties increase participation if strong ties do not dominate the 
network. Adding weak ties to a network characterized by  strong ties actually decreases 
participation.  
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Village Networks: Similar to small world networks, but less efficient in spreading 
information, weak ties across villages increase participation.  
 Core/Periphery Elite Networks: If the motivation and the number of elite actors with 
strong ties to each other in the core are high, this type of network structure performs much better 
than small world networks. When the motivation is low among the elites, the core/periphery 
structure performs very poorly in mobilizing participants for a collective action event.  
 Hierarchical Networks:  Findings are very similar to Core/periphery networks. But, if 
the motivation of the proletariat, people that are at the lower levels of the hierarchy,  is low,  it 
can successfully impede participation.  
2.5.1 Deriving some Hypotheses 
As mentioned previously, the data for this study consist of two different types of protest events: 
(1) mobilizations based on inter-organizational networks, and (2) mobilizations based on inter-
personal networks. These very different types of events also carry significantly different 
characterizations with regard to the external environment in which they operate in mobilization, 
strategies/resources, and framing tactics.  Therefore, each type of case requires unique 
hypotheses, and these hypotheses are introduced in relevant analytical chapters.  
 Based on the literature reviewed, it is possible to develop some overarching hypotheses. 
First, one shortcoming of the literature is its emphasis on the number of participants as the major 
indicator of collective action outcomes. This is in accordance with the argument that 
mobilization of large numbers of people tends to be associated with successful policy outcomes 
for the movements, because participation of large numbers of people indicates: (1 ) high levels of 
public support for the cause and may delegitimize the antagonists, (2) larger threat and costs for  
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the antagonists, (3)  likely possibility to garner more media attention, especially when the 
demands of the group  may be addressed by the antagonists, and (4) when the cost of repression 
is higher than meeting the demands  (Earl et al, 2003; Luders, 2006; and Button, 1978) .  
 Based on the current evidence on network structure and size of participation the first 
general hypothesis is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: If the motivations of the possible participants are high, hierarchical networks will 
mobilize a higher number of participants in comparison other network types, because 
hierarchical networks are the most efficient ones in spreading information. If the motivations are 
low, Small World Network type of structures will be more effective at mobilizing people because 
these networks consist of both strong and weak ties that are needed to activate participants.  
 
In addition to participation of a large number of participants, sometimes a small number 
of participants may be able to make antagonists meet their demands through use of disruptive 
tactics, if the larger population is sympathetic to their demands (Gamson, 1990; and Rojas, 
2006). Disruptive tactics require participants to be involved in high-risk activities such as the risk 
of detention and exposure to police violence. Consequently: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Strong ties are needed for participation in high-risk events. Village types of 
mobilization structures are likely to be more conducive for such behavior, because they mostly 
consist of strong ties, and very few weak ties, and they tend to mobilize [a] small number of 
people in comparison to other structures. 
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Finally, the literature on social movements emphasizes that sometimes movements fail to 
realize their stated goals, but can have larger cultural and social impacts such as emergence of 
alliances with other movements (Giugni, 1998; and Earl, 2004).  Such consequences may be 
crucial in nurturing potential movements that may have wider impacts in future.33 Based on the 
current evidence on resilience and robustness of social movements, the third larger hypothesis is 
as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Small World Network type of structures will be more likely to generate links with 
other movements. 
2.6 SUMMARY 
This chapter first discussed the challenges of understanding collective action outcomes since 
social movements tend to have a multitude of outcomes such as cultural, biographical, and 
incremental outcomes. Next, it made the argument that this study addresses those challenges to a 
certain extent by studying small scale collective action events that have relatively clear and 
simple policy goals that are somewhat easier to measure in comparison to the outcomes of 
complex and long term national or international movements. Section 2.2 provided a short 
overview of major social movement theories that explain the emergence, dynamics, and 
33 The roots of the Egyptian revolution is a good example of how failed movements  from 
the past can merge forces with other mobilizations and lead to meaningful change at some future 
time point. http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/mar/02/egypt-revolution-mubarak-
wall-of-fear 
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outcomes of movements based on three theoretical traditions: resource mobilization, framing 
perspective, and political opportunity structures.  
 Section 2.3 moved the discussion to the relationship between network topography and 
collective action outcomes. This section first introduced most commonly used levels of analysis 
of social networks, and then explained the reasoning behind focusing the study on whole level 
networks. Since the larger goal of this dissertation is to provide a contribution to understand the 
process of social change, the next section clarifies  the overarching perspective of the study on 
social change, mostly using complexity theory.  
The section on typologies of network structures introduced some of the major network 
structures that have been studied by social scientists and physicists over the years. Next, short 
explanations and visual descriptions of the network types used in this study are provided. The 
final section aims at providing a review of the literature on the performance of these different 
network structures in relation to collective action outcomes.  It concludes with some general 
hypotheses and highlights some caveats about simplified generalizations about the performance 
of different network structures and collective action outcomes. 
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3.0  DATA COLLECTION, RESEARCH DESIGN, AND DESCSRIPTION OF THE 
CONTEXT 
3.1 DATA SOURCES 
There are three main sources of data used in this study: police records, newspaper articles, and 
semi-structured interviews with the representatives of Social Movement Organizations (SMOs) 
and neighborhood residents. The three following analytical chapters also rely on some additional 
data sources for the specific research questions asked in each chapter. The details of the 
collection of additional data are discussed in relevant chapters.  
3.1.1 Data From Police Records 
One of the main challenges of this study was to identify major protest events in Ankara, Turkey, 
the geographical focus of the study. The universe of the study is the major protest events that 
took place between June 2006 and June 2011. Studies on reliability/validity of event analysis 
show that police records are the most reliable sources to identify past events (Koopmans and 
Rucht, 2002). Therefore, I used police records to identify the protest events in Ankara between 
2006 and 2011, provided by the Department of Social Movements of the General Directorate of 
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the Turkish National Police.3435 Overall, there are 183 events in the data set, and some of these 
events are related to the same issue. After categorizing these events into unique event categories, 
31 unique cases of social movements/collective action cases emerged. This data set also includes 
information about the approximate number of participants in each event, as well as the main 
organization or social group that organized event. 
After a closer look at these cases, I realized there were two distinct groups of cases. The 
first group consists of cases based on inter-organizational networks. These cases are mobilized 
by professional SMOs, carry a diverse repertoire of protest activities, have some kind of financial 
support, and their locus of change is towards issues regarding larger populations in Ankara. They 
include resistance movements against urban renewal projects, the use of water coming from 
Kizilirmak river as tap water due to health concerns, or protection of Kugulu Park from losing 
some of its space to new road construction. These cases can be called  social movements36 to a 
great extent because they have temporal continuity, and are mostly organized by professional 
SMOs with clear goals.  
The second group  includes cases that hardly qualify as social movements. In these cases, 
mobilization is mostly based on neighborhood level interpersonal networks, protests mostly 
develop spontaneously with minimal planning, no or very few formal organizations are involved, 
34 http://www.egm.gov.tr/en/Pages/default.aspx 
35  Also worth mentioning that I first tried to acquire the data from the Ankara branch 
of the Turkish National Police, but I was simply told that such data did not exist. I believe that 
over the years the General Directorate of the Turkish Police became more researcher friendly, 
mostly as a result of European Union adjustment programs and also increasingly well educated 
staff of the General Directorate.  
36 What constitutes as a social movement vs. collective action is discussed further in 
detail. 
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and such mobilizations do not tend to turn into social movements, due to lack of temporal 
continuity. 
I was not expecting  two such strikingly different groups of cases when I started to work 
on this project. As I looked deeper at these cases, I realized they tell two very different stories. 
Most importantly from a network perspective, these two groups of cases also enabled me to 
study two different types of network structures. In the first group, I study the inter-organizational 
networks of social movement events based on newspaper data. This type of network data just 
tells us about the alliances formed across organizations. It is not feasible to call every 
organization involved in the event and ask them how they found out/heard about this event. In 
other words, we can only know who was at what event and can only make claims about the 
alliance structures using network data from newspapers (Oliver et al. 2003). 
While the second group of cases at the neighborhood level does not qualify much as 
social movements, through my field interviews I was able to study the mobilization structures of 
these protest events. In other words, I was able to identify the pre-existing networks that 
facilitated the mobilization of neighborhood level protest events. These networks ranged from 
networks based on spatial arrangements of the neighborhood to women’s friendship networks. 
Overall, this study started with the expectation of analysis of a single type of social movement 
cases, but had to adapt to the nature of the data and turned into analysis of two distinct, but still 
highly related types of cases. 
3.1.2 Data from the Local Newspapers 
The data derived from the police records did not include information about the all organizations 
involved in the protest events. Therefore I used two local papers to extend my analysis: Hurriyet 
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Ankara37, and Baskent Gazetesi38. I chose to use only local news sources since studies on the 
extent of coverage of protest events show that local newspapers are much more inclusive than 
the national papers (Koopmans and Rucht, 2002). This observation holds especially true for 
studies that focus on local events.  
 Once I found the relevant newspaper articles for each event, I coded all names of the 
organizations involved in the event, if present, number of participants, location of the event, and 
type of event press release, vigil etc. I also tried to reach all other newspaper articles on all 
events that are affiliated with the movement such as conferences, festivals by simply going 
through the daily editions of each paper. As daunting as this task sounds, both papers are 
relatively small, they both report about 10 to 15 current local events excluding pages on sports, 
economy etc.. This approach enabled me to capture a more complete picture of each movement 
by including various movement activities in addition to protest type of events that are captured 
by the police records. 
 Relying on newspaper data has some obvious and significant shortcomings as highlighted 
in numerous reviews (e.g. Earl et al. 2004;  Baranco et al. 1999; McCarthy et al.., 1996; and 
Oliver et al. 2003). Earl et al. (2004) categorize common biases observed in newspaper data into 
two: (1) selection bias; and (2) description bias. Selection bias concerns the selection of events to 
be covered in the paper based on numerous factors such as the size of the event, proximity of the 
event to news agency, use of violence, or simply editorial decision making processes that label 
some events as newsworthy and some as not (Oliver et al. 2003; and Earl et al. 2004). This type 
37 http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ankara/ 
38 http://www.baskentgazete.com.tr/ 
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of bias is not a major concern for this study since selection of the events is based on the police 
records. 
 The second type of bias, description bias, on the other hand is a relevant concern for the 
study. Description bias is concerned with accuracy of the coverage of the news. The most 
important aspect of such bias in reporting of events is omission of information, or missing data 
(Earl et al. 2004; and Oliver et al. 2003). 
 This is a major concern especially from a network perspective, because studies show that 
central/core organizations tend to be overly reported whereas smaller, less influential 
organizations in the peripheries tend to be omitted during the reporting process (Diani, 2011). 
Studies further show that such biases tend to be constant, especially in over time data coming 
from the same source (Earl et al. 2004). Therefore it is very likely that the inter-organizational 
networks analyzed in the next chapter suffer from errors of omission of peripheral actors. While 
recognizing this problem, this research is still likely to produce generalizable findings, since the 
main goal is the categorization of the networks into five ideal types. In other words, the goal is 
not so much about identifying the exact numerical values of the network parameters, but instead 
it is to be able to rank each event network based on the network parameters. 
 In addition to these issues, Oliver (1989) (cited in Oliver et al. 2003) indicates that solely 
focusing on organizations neglects crucial non-organizational dynamics in collective action.  The 
interviews I did with activists and extensive archival research on the cases will likely mitigate 
this type of validity problem to a certain extent.  
 I did not choose to include network data gathered through interviews due to three major 
issues. First, it was practically impossible for me to do interviews with all the organizations 
involved in the data set. Secondly, research on the validity and reliability of social network data 
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shows that people do very poorly when it comes to remembering all of their acquaintances, 
especially their acquaintances in some past event (Carrington et al. 2006; and Knoke and Yang, 
2008). Finally, during my interviews, I observed a level of competition among the organizations 
involved in the same events. Some of the representatives of SMOs tend to inflate their centrality 
in the network while deflating the participation of others39. Or sometimes some SMOs refused to 
give credit to an organization because they just participated in the events, but were not involved 
in the course any further. 
3.1.3 Data from the Interviews 
In order to complement the inter-organizational network data gathered from the newspapers, I 
conducted 27 interviews with representatives of various SMOs located in Ankara. 40 All 
interviews were conducted by myself, at the offices of the SMOs. These interviews mostly were 
helpful to gain a better understanding of the critical issues that Ankara has been facing in the last 
decade.  
 The role of interviews for the analysis of inter-organizational networks has been 
complementary to the data I gathered from the police and newspapers. However, the network 
data I collected for the analysis of inter-personal networks solely depended on my interviews 
with the participants in the events. For each of the 17 events involving inter-personal networks, I 
contacted persons using  the names included in the newspaper articles. Some of these meetings 
39 There is an extensive literature on accuracy of network perception, and on determinants of 
accuracy. E.g. Casciaro, T. (1998). Seeing things clearly: Social structure, personality, and accuracy in 
social network perception. Social Networks, 204, 331-351. 
40 See Appendix A for interview protocols. 
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took place at muhtar’s41 office, sometimes in coffee shops, and sometimes in civic center types 
of places. In some of these meetings there were other participants from the events. My main goal 
in assessing these events was simply to identify the structure of mobilization networks based on 
the qualitative descriptions of the respondents. Consequently I asked the following questions that 
mostly required further clarifications: 
 
(1) Can you explain to me the events took place on  …/…/… with regard to the issue of…? 
(2) Who were the people involved in these protests? 
(3) How did they hear about this protest event? What were main means of communication 
used for coordination purposes? 
 
For example, from the following statement of a respondent, I concluded that the network 
structure resembled an elite core/periphery network with strong ties and high levels of 
motivations among the elites. 
 
“The women in the neighborhood organized the protest event that stopped traffic. They were 
very scared for their children, because there is no overpass and the traffic is very fast in the 
Istanbul road. While they were walking to block the road they asked the people they saw at the 
coffee shops and other places to join them.” 
41 Elected head of a neighborhood, mostly responsible for issuing IDs and organizing electoral 
bullets.  
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3.2 DATA ANALYSIS 
3.2.1 Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) 
QCA is the main analytical technique used in two of the analytical chapters. QCA is a technique 
developed by Charles Ragin (1987), and is used for medium-n cases in order to identify different 
causal mechanisms that may lead to the same outcome. QCA is based on the assumption that 
causal relations are very complex, and different combinations of causal conditions may lead to 
the same outcome (Ragin, 2007). As Ragin (2007) explains: 
 
 “An especially useful feature of QCA is its capacity for analyzing complex causation, 
defined as a situation in which an outcome may follow from several different combinations of 
causal conditions, that is from different causal recipes” (pg. 23). 
 
 While causal complexity can be handled to a certain extent using econometric models, 
such efforts usually come with a great deal of technical problems such as the multicollinearity 
issues that result from including interaction effects (Wagemann and Schnedier, 2010). Causal 
complexity is effectively used in comparative case studies, but such studies “suffer from 
generalizability since they yield idiosyncratic explanations for every single case” (Wagemann 
and Schnedier, 2010, p.11). 
A similar notion known as equifinality is also one of the epistemological foundations of 
QCA. George and Bennett (2005) define equifinality as “a pervasive characteristic of social 
phenomena, namely the fact that different causal processes can lead to similar outcomes of a 
given dependent variable” (pg.63). Equifinality contrasts highly with the unifinal approach 
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common in large-n statistical analyses that use linear and additive regression models (Wagemann 
and Schneider, 2010). 
Another important concept that undergirds the QCA’s epistemological underpinnings is 
called asymmetric causality. Unlike correlational approaches, QCA is based on set-theoretic 
connections in which explaining the presence of a phenomenon does not imply that this recipe 
also works for the absence of the same phenomenon. Ragin (2007) gives the example of the set 
theoretic relationship between political conservatives and religious fundamentalists. The fact that 
there are many political conservatives that are not religious fundamentalists does not undermine 
the fact that religious fundamentalists are politically conservative, since the religious 
fundamentalists constitute a subset of the universe of the political conservatives.  
In more practical terms, QCA utilizes set theoretic approaches to compare cases included 
in the analysis.  Each case in the analysis is represented as a combination of causal conditions 
and outcome conditions. Later, these combinations are compared with each other and logically 
simplified. For example, consider a simple example with three causal conditions: A, B, C, and an 
outcome condition denoted with O. Let's assume there are two configurations that lead to the 
same outcome: 
A*B*c + A*B*C  O   
 
This Boolean notation reads as follows (Rihoux and Meur, 2008, pg.35): [The presence 
of A, combined with the presence of B and with the presence of C] OR [The presence of A, 
combined with the presence of B and with the absence of C lead to the presence of outcome O. 
Since whether the condition C is present or absent does not make a difference, condition C is 
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dropped from the formulas, and the following reduced formula is attained (also known as Prime 
Implicant ). 
A*B O 
 
The final formula reads as presence of condition A in combination with the presence of B 
leads to the outcome O. 
QCA is especially relevant for studying collective action and social movements. As three 
of the leading scholars in the study of social movements, Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and 
Charles Tilly (2001) assert in their seminal work, Dynamics of Contention, the main goal of 
students of social movements is to decipher the causal mechanisms and processes. McAdam et 
al. (2001) invite scholars of social movements to study contentious episodes in comparative 
perspective and to identify the common causal mechanisms among cases that may seem quite 
different from each other. Similarly, Ragin (2013) argues that QCA is a particularly suitable 
method for studying social movements because “social movements are conjectural in nature and 
a central goal of research on social movements and collective action is to unravel the relevant 
causal recipes and to specify their various ingredients” pg. 1031. 42 
QCA also has certain shortcomings, most significantly lack of consideration of 
probabilistic processes. Such limitations affect the study and will be further discussed in the 
concluding chapter.  
42 Some major studies that use QCA to study collective action are McAdam et al (2010); 
Dixon et al. (2004); Cress and Snow (2000); and Amenta et al. (1992) 
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3.2.2 Multiple Regression Quadratic Procedure (MRQAP) 
The fifth chapter  looks  at the larger picture of the state of urban movements in Ankara, using 
the classic urban movement theories of Manuel Castells.  In order to achieve that larger picture, 
all the matrices of the social movement cases analyzed separately in the fourth chapter are 
combined. The combination of these matrices generates one large matrix of inter-organizational 
networks in Ankara. After some basic analysis of this combined network (e.g. which 
organizations are most central, structural properties etc.), a Multiple Regression Quadratic 
Assignment Procedure (MRQAP) is carried out in order to understand the emergence of ties 
across SMOs included in the analysis. MRQAP is a regression-like analysis in which matrices 
are used instead of vectors as input variables. For both QCA and MRQAP analyses, packages 
available in the R environment are used.  
3.3 CONTEXT OF THE STUDY 
The study focuses on certain collective action events/cases that took place between 2006 and 
2011 in Ankara, Turkey. There are several reasons for choosing Ankara as the main setting of the 
study. First, my preliminary observations in other major cities showed that urban movement type 
of events are very few in Turkish cities other than Ankara and Istanbul. Istanbul, on the other 
hand, had too many cases to cover, even based on my preliminary review of newspapers. I 
decided to choose Ankara, because the amount of urban movement activity seemed neither too 
little, nor too much to handle.  
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 Secondly, the local political environment in Ankara has been relatively constant in 
comparison to other cities in Turkey.  The same mayor has governed the city since 1994. 
Similarly the heads of municipalities did not change during the local elections of 2009 among the 
townships that cover most of the cases analyzed, except Yenimahalle. Therefore, political 
opportunity structure related conditions remain mostly steady across the time span of the study. 
This situation also limits the number of conditions included in the analysis, since as a rule of 
thumb, no more than five or six conditions should be included when the number of cases  is 
between 13 and 25 (Marx, 2006).   
 The following sections give a succinct overview of the context of study by looking at 
state-civil society relations in Turkey, state of local governance in Turkey, and some basic socio-
demographic information about Ankara in comparison to Turkey. 
 
3.3.1 Civil Society in Turkey 
It is a known fact that Turkey is characterized by a very strong and centralized state tradition and 
a weak civil society (Heper, 1985). The roots of weak civil society can be easily traced back to 
the power of the state and bureaucratic elite during the Ottoman era (Mardin, 1969). As Mardin 
(1969) argues, the Ottoman ruling class was very much concerned with keeping control of a 
religiously and ethnically heterogeneous empire. Consequently, there was no tolerance for the 
emergence of different interest groups (Heper, 2000). Moreover, all of the land under the control 
of the empire legally belonged to the Sultan. Having total control over economic life also 
contributed to the suppression of any social group that could challenge the power and authority 
of the state elite (Mardin, 1969).  
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As Mardin 1969 puts it: 
 
 “In Ottoman society there were no institutional political privileges and 
immunities, all Ottoman citizens stood in a direct rather than mediated relationship to the 
supreme authority. This missing link we call civil society. It could be expected that 
Turkey would encounter difficulties in the development of modern democracy to the 
extent that this depends on this missing link” (pg.279). 
 
This picture of an omnipotent centralized state did not change much with the birth of the 
new republic in 1923. Some of the peculiarities of Turkey’s extreme emphasis on the formation 
of a unitary state can be traced back to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. In late 1800s and 
early 1900s, many non-Muslim minorities such as the Serbians, and Greeks claimed their 
independence, almost all the time with the support of a foreign power Akcam, (1992). This 
dissolution process has mostly been perceived as an act of betrayal by the Turks and developed a 
sense of insecurity and fear towards the minorities that remained within the borders of modern 
Turkey (Akcam, 1992).  
A series of Kurdish insurgencies in the 1920s and 1930s also fed the feelings of threat 
and anxieties of the Kemalist elite, and led to the emergence of a very strict centralized state 
system that emphasized unity at the expense of diversity and pluralism (Baban, 2005). Following 
the proclamation of the new republic, the Turkish state actively promoted the formation of 
NGOs, but this top down approach led to emergence of many NGOs that acted as extensions of 
the state and failed to function as intermediaries between citizens and the state (Karaman and 
Aras, 2000). 
 60 
According to Keyman and Icduygu (2005) the four defining elements of the modern 
Turkish republic are: (1) a strong state tradition through which the state acts as the privileged 
and sovereign power operating almost independently from society with an assumed capacity to 
transform the society from above and deciding which groups, in what ways could legitimately 
participate in the political life. (2) National Developmentalism as a corollary of the strong state 
tradition, where the state has been the dominant economic actor till 1980s with an emphasis on 
planned imports substituting for industrialization. (3 ) The organic vision of society- as a way of 
defining state society relations on the basis of mutual duties and services instead of individual 
rights and freedoms. (4) The republican model of citizenship- through which the republican elite 
framed the notion of citizenship as a morally loaded category to achieve a unified national 
identity by emphasizing national interest, individual duties, and state sovereignty, instead of a 
more liberal approach that would emphasize individual autonomy, rights and freedoms.  
By the early 1980s, these four elements of Turkish modernity started to be challenged 
and transformed by the forces of globalization. Despite such recent trends, civic participation 
remains very low in Turkey 
As displayed in Figure 9, Turkey ranks last in almost all measures that are used to gauge 
civic participation in the European Social Survey. Only 2.7 % of the participants in the survey 
worked in a political party, 4% worked in an association other than political parties, 3.2% 
worked or displayed campaign badge/sticker, 4.3% signed a petition, and 6.1% participated in a 
lawful demonstration. 
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Figure 9 Civic Participation in Turkey 
 
 
The military coup in 1980 had a tremendously detrimental effect on civic participation 
because the military junta punished all sorts of political and organized civil society activity in 
dramatic ways upon taking power. Following the coup43,44: 
 
- The parliament and all political parties were shut down,  
- 650,000 people were detained, 
- 1,683,000 people were blacklisted, 
- 50 people were hanged, 
43 http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/24999286/ 
44 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/1980-coup-facts.aspx?pageID=238andnid=17628 
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- Newspapers were not allowed to publish any issues for 300 days, 
- And all civil society organizations were shut down except the Red Crescent, which 
acts more like a state organization.  
 
On the other hand, civic participation seemed to be sparked by the Gezi Park uprising that 
started at the end of May 2013. What started as an environmentalist effort to protect the last 
green space in downtown Istanbul from becoming a mall, quickly turned into an anti-government 
rights based movement. According to some preliminary studies on the profile of the protestors, 
79% of the participants in the protest events do not have membership in any type of organization, 
and 40 % of the participants had never participated in a protest event before45.  Therefore, there 
is a chance that civic participation in Turkey will significantly increase following the Gezi Park 
movement. 
3.3.2 Local Governance Structure in Turkey 
With the rise of neo-liberal policies in 1980s, local governments also went through significant 
transformations (Erder and Incioglu, 2008). The autonomy and resources of local governments 
increased considerably (Erder and Incioglu, 2008).  
On the other hand, as Bayraktar (2007) argues, this transformation of the local 
governments did not translate into development of local democracy in Turkey. In 1984 a new 
legislation Law No. 3030. led to the emergence of two layered municipal governments in large 
cities such as Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir (Erder and Incioglu, 2008). With this new law, district 
45 http://sosyalmedya.co/konda-gezi-parki-anketi/ 
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based municipalities were preserved but with the birth of metropolitan municipalities they lost 
most of their powers and resources (Bayraktar, 2007). Moreover, the structure of municipalities 
was far from being democratic since transparency, accountability, and public participation in 
decision making processes was not part of the new legislation (Bayraktar, 2007). 
According to Bayraktar (2007) and, Erder and Incioglu (2008), the metropolitan 
municipalities are very much characterized with very powerful mayors. Despite the existence of 
municipal councils, they have limited power in decision-making processes since the mayor is 
also the president of the council and s/he decides the agenda of the meetings.  In the case of 
inconclusive voting, the mayor has the power to make the final decision (Bayraktar, 2007). 
Moreover, members of the council tend to follow the opinions of the mayor, especially when 
they belong to the same political party, and the composition of the councils is far from 
representing the diverse social and economic structure of the local citizens (Erder and İncioğlu, 
2008, and Bayraktar, 2007). In addition to these conditions, citizen participation in the council’s 
decisions is also quite limited; bridges get built, roads change, and houses get demolished 
without any input from the citizens (Koker, 1995).  
Ankara is no exception when it comes to the state of local democracies in Turkey. I. 
Melih Gokcek, member of the ruling Justice and Development Party AKP, has been the mayor of 
Ankara since 1994. The Gokcek administration is known to use all available means to suppress 
opposition in local politics. Union member public employees are forced to resign, there is a 
tremendous increase at the outsourcing of municipal services to private companies without any 
public surveillance; transportation, energy, and water fees in Ankara are the highest in Turkey, 
and there is almost no public participation in policy making processes.  
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Despite some attempts by the central government such as local city councils to include 
citizen participation in the decision-making, such councils in Ankara are mostly defunct since 
most civil society actors in Ankara were either not invited to meetings or were not given voice.  
Participation in such councils has decreased significantly since they were first established in 
2007. Members of the municipality councils or groups that are sympathetic to the current mayors 
and heads of local municipalities continue to occupy the important seats in these councils. 
Recommendations produced in these councils almost never conflict with the views of the 
mayors.  
3.3.3 Turkey and the European Union 
There was an era of promising reforms by the Turkish governments and optimism for full 
membership following the recognition of Turkey as a candidate country by the Helsinki Council 
in 1999. Currently the state of EU-Turkey relations can be described as stagnant at best, if not in 
a state of downfall. Among the thirty-five chapters that Turkey needs to close in order to 
complete the negotiations, only thirteen have been opened, and only one is closed (the chapter on 
research and science), while eight of them are frozen by the EU Council in order to respond to 
Turkey’s decision to refuse to establish trade relations with the Greek Cyprus46. Furthermore, 
public support for EU membership in Turkey dropped from 73% in 2004 to 38% in 2010s, and 
support for Turkey’s membership in EU at member states continues to remain scant47. 
46 EU Commission calls for opening of energy chapter in Turkish accession process. (April, 23, 
2013). Hurriyet Daily News. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/eu-commission-calls-for-opening-of-energy-chapter-in-turkish-
accession-process.aspx?pageID=238&nID=45042&NewsCatID=351 
47 For Turkey, Lure of Tie to Europe Is Fading. (December 4, 2011). New York Times. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/05/world/europe/for-turkey-lure-of-european-union-is-fast-
fading.html?pagewanted=all 
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 One of the major challenges for Turkey to realize full membership in EU is to succeed in 
the application of “the Copenhagen political criteria” which require the development and 
stabilization of institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect 
for and protection of minorities” (Muftuler-Bac, 2005).  In 2001, the EU Commission adopted 
the Accession Partnership for Turkey (Ministry of EU Affairs, 2007). Following the adoption of 
the Accession Partnership, Turkish government declared its National Program for the Adoption 
of the EU acquisition on March 19th, 2001 (Ministry of EU Affairs, 2007). Following the 
Copenhagen summit of December 2002, Turkey was given two years, till 2004 to meet the 
Copenhagen political criteria in order to open the negotiations without any delay (Ministry of EU 
Affairs, 2007). 
 Meanwhile, Turkish politics was going through significant changes. In 2002, the 
conservative AKP won the general elections, and was able to set up a majority government 
without the need for coalition partners for the first time in more than ten years. While the reform 
processes had already started in 2001, it was the AKP government that displayed strong political 
will to implement extensive reforms to meet the Copenhagen political criteria (Kirissci, 2004; 
and Muftuler-Bac 2005). These reforms were in the form of changes in the 1982 constitution that 
was written by the junta regime, and legislation of new laws. By the end of 2004, nine reform 
packages had been passed by Turkish National Assembly, TBMM (Kubicek, 2005).  
These institutional changes had significant impact on a variety of issues that are vital for 
the development of a functioning democracy such minority rights, women’s rights, restriction of 
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the military power, and on the legal framework in which NGOs operate48. However, the reform 
process has been increasingly stagnating since 2005, and the EU has been losing its leverage as 
an external force for the consolidation of democracy in Turkey especially following the 
increasing authoritarian tendencies of the AKP government after its second electoral victory in 
2007 (Aydin-Duzgit and Keyman, 2013) 
 
3.3.4 Some Basic Facts about Ankara 
Figure 10 Picture of Ankara in 1920s 
 
 
Source: Personal Archive of Onge, 2007 
48 There is an extensive research on these institutional reforms initiated by the EU 
accession process in Turkey (e.g. Onis, 2003; Sarigil 2007; Rumford 2001; Heper, 2005; Usul, 
2010; Schimmelfennig, 2003; Oguzlu, 2004; and Kubicek, 2005).  
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 Ankara was a small declining Ottoman town with a population less than 30,000 when the new 
Republic decided to make it the capital city of Turkey  in October 1923 (Onge, 2007; Tankut, 
1994; and Batuman, 2013). It had been a central and very multicultural production and 
commercial town during the Ottoman Empire in 17th and 18th century, but it lost  prominence 
within the empire due to various political and economic reasons.  
 
Figure 11 Picture of Ankara in 1920s-II 
 
 
 Source: Personal Archive of Onge, 2007 
 
As the Figure 12 demonstrates, Ankara is strategically located in the center of Anatolia, 
and was considered to be suitable to be the new capital of a new nation mostly due to this reason. 
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Figure 12 Map of Turkey 
 
 
Source: Google, Mapsengine 
 
Ankara was not only important as the new capital of the Republic, but it had been designed and 
built as the new symbol, example city of a modern Turkey, similar to European capitals without 
any references to Ottoman cultural heritage or architectural style that dominated Istanbul (Onge, 
2007; Tankut, 1994; and Batuman, 2013). 
By the early 1950s, technological improvements in agriculture and improved roads and 
infrastructure generated a large migration to cities.  
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Table 1 Population Growth in Ankara and Turkey 
 
 
 
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute, 2013 
 
          The infrastructure and labor markets of cities were not ready for this unprecedented 
migration to cities in 1950s. Unable to meet the demand for housing, authorities condoned the 
emergence of squatter houses on public land known as gecekondu, meaning built over night by 
the migrants with the help of migrant communities.  
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Figure 13 Dostlar Neighborhood, Ankara 
 
 
Source, Photo taken during fieldwork, November 2012. 
 
The gecekondu neighborhood in the picture above is one of the last remaining ones that 
were built in 1950s. More and more such neighborhoods are redeveloped by the Housing 
Development Administration of Turkey (TOKI). Such projects are further discussed in the 
coming chapters since some cases that mobilized against such redevelopment projects are 
included in the study. In sum, these projects are very controversial due various reasons. Most 
importantly, gecekondu residents are forced to pay exorbitant amounts for an apartment building, 
move to distant suburbs of the city, and many ex-gecekondu residents have trouble adjusting to 
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the life style in tall apartment buildings, since many of them used to rely on informal economic 
and social support systems common among the migrant communities in gecekondu 
neighborhoods. Moreover, many people I interviewed resist to leave their gecekondus and state 
that for decades they are used to live in a certain life style that is characterized by close contact 
with nature most of them have small gardens, and by strong supportive community networks 
despite all the infrastructure related problems in the poorly constructed gecekondu type of 
structures e.g. toilets outside the main house.  
 
Figure 14 An Example of Apartment Complexes that Replaces Gecekondu 
Neighborhoods 
 
 
Source: Turkey’s Housing Development Administration of Turkey TOKI website, 2013 
 
 72 
The mass affordable housing projects in Ankara as displayed in Figure 14 highly 
resemble the grand ensembles of Paris that were common in 1960s and were not constructed 
after the 1970s anywhere in France. The current experience in many grand ensembles of Ankara 
is very similar to how Castells 1984 defined the life in Sarcelles49, the first and most memorable 
grand ensemble of Paris:  
 
“… They were forced to live in the midst of a construction, with no amenities, poor 
transportation, and a total absence of urban life. The studies on the social relationships 
in Sarcelles during the 1950s and early 1960s show dramatic decreases in the extension 
and richness of social networks and human interaction in comparison with the resident’s 
former experiences. The isolation was especially acute for women many of whom had to 
give up their jobs in Paris in order to take care of their children, while also losing their 
contacts with their friends, family, and neighbors which they enjoyed in their 
overcrowded by intense human environment” (pg. 80).  
 
Table 2 Urban Renewal Projects in Ankara 
Source, Batuman 2013 
49 There is even a disease called sarcellite named after the Sarcelle experience in France 
to denote a condition when a person feels alienated and disconnected from other human beings 
as a result of poor spatial and social arrangements of  the neighborhood in which  one lives .  A 
few of my respondents mentioned their friends that committed suicide as a result of their in 
ability to adjust to the lifestyle in multistory buildings built on spaces literally in the middle of 
nowhere with no social and cultural amenities  or proper public transportation.  
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Figure 15 Districts of Ankara 
 
 
Source: Ankara Metropolitan Municipality 
 
Ankara consists of 25 districts. During local elections that are held every five years, the 
mayor for the Ankara, as well as heads of municipalities for each district are elected. Despite 
having power on most practical issues on Ankara, the mayor is still considered hierarchically 
below the governor, who is appointed by the central government for each city in Turkey. Most 
importantly, police forces mostly operate still directly under the control of the governor. Election 
of the governor by popular votes instead of being appointed by the central government is one of 
the major demands of many mobilizations towards democratization in Turkey. 
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Table 3 Socio-demographic Characteristics of Ankara by Districts 
 
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute, 2013 
 
Table 3 represents the distribution of Ankara’s population across its districts. The 
highlighted districts constitute the urbanized central districts of Ankara, whereas the remaining 
districts mostly remain as rural settings. All of the cases studied in the following chapters are set 
within these urban districts of Ankara. More contextual information about the analyzed cases is 
provided in analytical chapters. 
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3.4 SUMMARY 
 
The main goal of this chapter was to provide information about the main data sources collected 
in the study. The first section discussed the data collection processes for protest event-data based 
on police records, use of newspaper accounts, and interviews with SMO representatives and 
neighborhood residents. Discussion of data aimed at also highlighting some of the weaknesses of 
reliance on newspaper accounts such as description bias.  
 Next section briefly introduced QCA, and discussed some of the epistemological 
underpinnings of this method such as complex causality, equifinality, and asymmetric causality, 
in addition to the illustration of the minimization process with a simple example.  
 The following sections were aimed providing some background information about the 
context of the study. It started with a short view of the state of state civil society relations in 
Turkey, continued with a short overview of the local governance structure in Turkey, and finally 
provided some basic information about Ankara and its districts.  
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4.0  CONSEQUENCES OF INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL NETWORKS: THE CASE 
OF URBAN MOVEMENTS IN ANKARA, 2006-2011 
The structure of organizations is rapidly moving away from the well-known bureaucratic 
arrangements first criticized by Weber in early 20th century that are characterized by strict 
centralization of functions and hierarchical command and control systems that were designed by 
the unrealistic assumptions of perfect rationality and a simple linear approach to the design and 
implementation organizational tasks. The collapse of the Socialist Bloc by the end of cold war 
and the rise of globalization were among the most important political factors that pushed the 
governance model around the globe. As the omnipresent state that provided all kinds of services 
to its citizens while closing all channels for its citizens for challenging its operations was not 
anymore a viable option by the defeat of Soviet Union, the role of government started to be more 
and more debated around the world (Kettl, 2005).  
These socio-political changes around globe since the early 1980s also led to some kind of 
legitimation crisis for traditional political parties. Inter-organizational networks, a unique form of 
organizing that is neither purely bureaucratic and hierarchical nor completely self-governing as 
markets started to replace political parties as the main form of political representation of the 
masses (Powell, 1990; Hadenius, 2001).  
These leaderless, decentralized alliances of organizations are assumed most of the time to 
be the result of reciprocal trust, and characterized by participatory and egalitarian decision 
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making processes that are considered to be more democratic forms of organizing in comparison 
to hierarchical, traditional party based mobilizations (Diani, 2011). In contrast, research on inter-
organizational networks show that these networks come in many different forms and can still be 
hierarchical, and characterized by lack of trust, reciprocity and democratic decision making 
processes (Ashman and Sugawara, 2012).  
The goal of this chapter is to investigate these different forms of inter-organizational 
networks in relation to the policy outcomes of these networked mobilizations using QCA. The 
first section of this chapter provides description of the cases. As Rihoux and Lobe (2008) 
indicate there are three main phases of QCA: (1) case descriptions that provide some historical, 
context based information, (2) analytic moment of QCA by identifying the minimal formulas, 
and (3) interpretation of different causal paths. 
4.1 CASE DESCRIPTIONS 
4.1.1 Kugulu Park 
Kugulu Park is a small 2.47 acres park located in middle class/upper middle class Cankaya 
district of Ankara known for its swans and its little pond. It is around a neighborhood surrounded 
by embassies, as well as by many shops and restaurants. It addition to the swans, the park  also 
houses 24 different bird species. It is a first degree preserved natural site protected by the 
Turkey’s Culture and Natural Heritage Preservation Board. The park is considered as one of the 
symbols of Ankara, and is one of very few recreational spaces in central Ankara. It is an 
important space that has an important role in Ankarian identity, also has a special place for 
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people who grew up in the 1980s and onwards, because it is a common activity among families 
with small children to visit the park, and feed the swans and the pigeons.  
 In August 2006, the Greater Municipality of Ankara, headed by I. Melih Gokcek, 
applied for, and got a permission from the Ankara Branch of Culture and Natural Heritage 
Preservation Board  to demolish a portion of the park for an underpass project that was opposed 
by most of the residents, the main neighborhood association Kavakliderem, as well as by 
professional organizations such as Chamber of City Planners, Chamber of Architects, and 
Chamber of Environmental Engineers. The project was criticized since it prioritized car traffic 
over pedestrian rights and because underpasses encourage drivers to drive faster and can cause 
accidents50.   
 Despite general discontent with the underpass project, there was no organized 
opposition until the Culture and Natural Heritage Preservation Board granted permission for the 
demolition of some part of the park. The news spread quickly and an occupy type of self-
organized movement emerged within hours. When people arrived at the park, they were 
confronted with the bulldozers of the Greater Municipality of Ankara. Various activities such as 
concerts, art related workshops for kids were carried out for about three days. Most importantly, 
the head of Cankaya district/municipality, who is a member of the main opposition party CHP, 
provided vital support during the occupation by sending municipality workers to protect the trees 
of the park from destruction.  
 The occupation ended with success, the trees of the park were saved, and the 
underpass project had to be modified by the Greater Municipality of Ankara in order to exclude 
50 As a result of this project numerous pedestrian lost their lives because cars leaving the 
underpass tend to drive very fast. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ankara/20787291.asp 
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the parts of Kugulu Park from the plan. 
4.1.2 Kavaklidere Movie Theater  
Kavaklidere Movie Theater was one of the few remaining non-mall based historical theaters 
when it was shut down in 2007 after 38 years since its establishment. Only 350-400 feet away 
from the Kugulu Park, it was also considered  one of the symbols of downtown Ankara, and it 
had been home to many festivals from Turkey and Europe. Kavaklidere Theater would mostly 
show art movies that were rarely  selected by the multiplex theaters in the malls. The family that 
owns the theater also owns some other shops and businesses around Kavaklidere Theater, and 
decided to close the theater due to lack of enough revenues. On October 2009, a group of 
neighborhood organizations headed by Kavakliderem started a campaign to reinvigorate the 
interest of the public at the theater and organized multiple events. This mobilization failed to 
ignite a determined and strong resistance among large populations in Ankara, and the theater still 
mostly remains an idle space.  
4.1.3 Kizilirmak River as Water Supply of Ankara 
The summer of 2007 in Ankara is also known as the summer of drought. As a result of poor 
policy and planning, and also due to little precipitation in the winter and spring months, water 
levels in the dams that supply the city water of Ankara were mostly exhausted by the beginning 
of summer. I. Melih Gokcek, the elected head of Greater Municipality of Ankara famously asked 
Ankarians to not to take showers very often, and suggested that residents of Ankara should 
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consider  going on vacation or visiting their relatives in other cities51.     
  
 In order to conserve water, the municipality started to employ a  ‘two days on, two 
days off’ strategy (Franz, 2012). To deal with the water crises  I. Melih Gokcek advanced the 
Kizilirmak project to provide additional water supply for Ankara.  Simultaneously, a group of 
experts started to raise concerns about the health risks associated with the quality of Kizilirmak 
water. Professional associations such as Chamber of Civil Engineers, and Chamber of Chemical 
Engineers released various technical reports and press releases (e.g. IMO, 2007). The main 
concern of these experts was the high levels of arsenic found in the Kizilirmak River, which may 
lead to health problems such as diarrhea and dysentery. In order to refute the claims of such 
organizations, a couple of technical reports based on the tests of the municipality as well as the 
Ministry of Health were also published52.  
 Meanwhile, multiple protest events, as well as conferences were organized by a 
larger network of organizations that involved SMOs, political parties, professional associations, 
neighborhood organizations, and consumer rights groups. Despite such efforts, during the days 
following the crisis, I. Melih Gokcek stated that the water brought from the Kizilirmak River had 
been used in the city for the last 21 days. He argued that he chose  not to make this information 
public because he did not trust the opposition and that they would fabricate high numbers of 
diarrhea cases if they knew ahead. In contrast, the chairman of the Chamber of Physicians of 
Ankara stated that the long-term chemical effects of the Kizilirmak River could be detrimental to 
51http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2007/08/02/haber,6A3F1D60841B4861B0D7DF9AF0D52D04.html 
52http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?load=detayandlink=144713 
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public health in the long term.53 
4.1.4 Saving Yeni Sahne 
Yeni Sahne, located in the city center in Kizilay, was the main theater hall where the Turkish 
State Theaters of Ankara, Ankara Devlet Tiyatrolari, staged their shows. The building belonged 
to the Foresters’ Association of Turkey (TOD), but has been rented by the State Theater for more 
than 40 years when TOD decided  not to renew the contract of the building in the summer of 
2006. There was a large mobilization of mostly art communities of Ankara. Many, including the 
Chamber of Architects, and Planners, considered it  a historic heritage for Ankara  due to its 
unique architecture as a signature building that constitutes a significant role in the urban visual 
memory of Ankara. The Head of Cankaya district and member of the opposition party, Muzaffer 
Eryılmaz, also participated in the protests and even offered to provide a new space for TOD that 
had more land value than Yeni Sahne. Despite all efforts, TOD turned the Yeni Sahne building 
into a mini-mall and signs of Burger King replaced the signs of Yeni Sahne by 2008. 
4.1.5 Labor Standards in OSTIM and Ivedik 
OSTIM and Ivedik are organized industrial zones that host businesses on various sectors such as 
furniture production, production of car parts, electrical works etc. On February 2011, two 
consecutive explosions happened in OSTIM and Ivedik that led to the deaths of 21 workers. The 
families of these workers demanded increased inspection at these businesses and inspection by  
53 http://bianet.org/bianet/bianet/107329-gokcek-ishal-yok-dedi-peki-ya-kizilirmak-in-kimyasal-
etkileri 
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the municipality increased to a certain extent. The families of the workers formed a platform 
among themselves to bring responsible parties to justice. From a movement perspective, the 
greatest achievement of the mobilization that started following the OSTIM and Ivedik explosions 
are the ability of families to form relations with families of other workers that die due to low 
labor standards in other cities, and as well as in other sectors.  
 Currently the families of the victims of OSTIM and Ivedik explosions are organized 
under Conscience and Justice Watch and continue to work for higher labor standards not only in 
OSTIM and Ivedik but in overall Turkey.  
4.1.6 Rights and the Protection of Street Animals in Ankara 
The winter of 2006 in Ankara witnessed massacre of many stray animals, mostly dogs in Ankara. 
Bodies of about 60 dogs were found dead in Mamak, and Portakal Cicegi Street within a week. 
Animal rights’ organizations blamed  the workers of municipalities, and charged them with 
carrying out most of the killings.  
 The following months witnessed very successful mobilizations by the animal rights’ 
NGOs. Multiple protests events were organized by  large numbers of participants in Ankara and 
in some other cities. There was significant coverage of the protest events in national TV and 
papers. These protests were also supported by animal rights groups internationally, most notably 
in Germany. There was tremendous support from celebrity figures as well as political parties. 
The mobilizations efforts were supplemented with a media campaign that used powerful videos 
and stories of street animals in Ankara. The protests ended with a new legislation that increased 
fines for crimes against animals, the number of shelters for street animals increased significantly, 
and massacres at the scale that started the movement have not been seen again since  the protests. 
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4.1.7 Mobilizations against the Price Increases in Bread, City Water, and Heating Gas 
Three of the cases focus on protests and other forms of social movement activities against the 
increasing prices of essential goods including bread, water, and gas. Ankara continues to have 
the highest prices for all these commodities in comparison to all other cities in Turkey.  
 Protests against the price increase in gas started in 2006. Despite the protests, gas 
prices have continued to increase every year, as much as 80% in the five years following 2006.  
Mobilizing organizations consisted of mostly consumer rights organizations, and these 
organizations claimed that the motivation behind the unparalleled increases were due to the 
irresponsible planning of the Greater Municipality of Ankara in terms of managing its debt to 
BOTAS, Petroleum Pipeline Corporation, the main public institution that provides natural gas to 
municipalities. Similarly, in 2009 there has been a short-lived mobilization against the increases 
in water prices mostly led by consumer rights groups, and Halk Evleri.54  
 Finally, there has been a short mobilization towards  increases in the price of bread 
sold at state subsidized bakeries. In this mobilization the main antagonist was the association of 
bread makers of Ankara. Similarly, this urban movement also failed to reverse the decision of the 
price hikes.  
54 HalkEvleri is a human rights organization that works on a multitude of issues including 
the right to housing, work, and basic services. It is organized all around Turkey, and follows a 
bottom up organizing approach with many branches in working class neighborhoods in many 
cities of Turkey. Based on my field work, HalkEvleri seems to be the most effective SMO, with 
a large social base in the gecekondu  areas, as well as other working class towns of Ankara.  
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4.1.8 Resistance Movements against Urban Renewal Projects in Polatli, Altindag, and 
Dikmen 
As shortly mentioned in the previous chapter, the urban renewal projects in large cities such as 
Ankara, Izmir, and Istanbul have been one of the defining characteristics of urban experience in 
Turkey in the last decades. Once built in not so preferred urban spaces like on valley bottom 
sloping hillsides, the squatter houses known as gecekondus were still located close to central 
business districts and the main transportation axes (Uzun, 2003; and Senyapili, 1997). As the 
cities expanded, the value of the land occupied by the gecekondus increased tremendously over 
the years. As Smith (2002) states about such projects around the globe, most of the urban 
renewal projects carried out by local municipalities are  motivated to make use of this increased 
land value. In a way these projects aim at physical and demographic ‘upgrading’ (Kuyucu and 
Unsal, 2010) of deteriorating neighborhoods.  
 During my interviews at these sites of the contested projects, most residents stated that 
they were not against the projects as long as their interests were prioritized. Most residents made 
statements that highly resonated with the literature suggesting that the projects aimed at getting 
rid of them, and make space for upper class gated housing complexes. The demands of the 
resisters across different projects tend to be similar: (1) Not  be forced to move to outside of the 
city, (2) Each owner of the gecekondu is compensated based on the size of the land  owned. 
Owners require higher rates of compensation, so that they owe less for the apartment that will be 
provided by TOKI. (3) Also, gecekondu renters require rent support since it is almost impossible 
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to find rental housing in the city with similar rates to gecekondus.  If they move outside of city, 
then the transportation costs per month increase dramatically55. 
4.1.9 Saving Ataturk Orman Ciftligi/ Atatürk Forest Farm and Zoo (AOC) 
The story of AOC starts with  Ankara becoming the capital of Turkey in the 1920s. AOC was 
founded by Ataturk in 1925 on a vast parcel of land, about 25 204.748 91 acres56. AOC includes 
experimental farming lands, diary products are produced and sold under AOC brand, and there  
are many recreational areas as well as cafes and restaurants (Gokturk, 1997).  
            Managed by the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock (Gida Tarim Hayvamcilik 
Bakanligi), over the years AOC lost about 36% of its land to various projects including housing 
projects, construction projects for building modern buildings for various government institutions, 
and also   provision of land for new universities (Atak and Sahin, 2004).  
            In April 2006, the legislation proposed  by Ankara MP Salih was passed to allow further 
redevelopment of AOC. The main concern of the opposition to the legislation was the ambiguity 
of the bill in terms of how much land it allowed the Greater Municipality of Ankara to be used 
for infrastructure projects. Mostly consisting of professional organizations like Chamber of 
Planners, Architects, the protesting organizations raised their concerns that this new legislation 
may bring the end of AOC in the hands of Greater Municipality of Ankara by allowing the 
municipality to build roads, bridges, and subway entrances/exits.  
            The mobilization ended with success with participation of many SMOs in multiple 
protests, petition campaigns, and forums aimed at raising awareness about the passed legislation.  
55 More information provided for each case in the raw data matrix. 
56 For the English Webpage of AOC: http://www.aoc.gov.tr/index.php?act=langandlid=1  
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4.1.10 Underpass by the Historic Train Station 
On December 2008, Greater Municipality of Ankara approved a project of interexchange and 
underpass to be built right in front of the old train station TCDD. I. Melih Gokcek, head of 
Greater Municipality of Ankara claimed that the project was necessary to solve the traffic 
problem at the old town section of Ankara. 
 
Figure 16 Photo taken During Construction of the Underpass 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Hurriyet Ankara, December 2008 
 
            A similar group of professional organizations mobilized to reverse the decision on the 
grounds that too many trees would be lost in the process, the historical train station could get 
physical damage, and most importantly, the area would lose its pedestrian friendly character that 
is vital to a healthy, lively downtown. Despite multiple protests and various other movement 
activities, the movement failed to reverse the decision of the Greater Municipality of Ankara. 
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4.2 NETWORK DATA AND OPERATIONALIZATIONS OF THE NETWORK 
STRUCTURES 
The raw data used for the analysis include a two-mode matrix in which rows represent 
organizations and columns represent social movement events such as protests, press releases etc. 
Two-mode matrices can easily be transformed into one mode by multiplying the two mode 
matrix with its transpose e.g. assume X is a two-mode network, X is transformed into A, the one 
mode network by using the simple formula A=XX`,  (Borgatti, 2009). 
              After the transformation, each case has a one-mode network, Organization X 
Organization, both rows and columns are organizations. These weighted, undirected matrices are 
then transformed into non-valued matrices 0,1 since the structure-related analysis is harder to 
perform with weighted data. The weighted data will be considered in the next chapter while 
analyzing determinants of formation of ties across organizations.  
            The network structures are visualized using VISONE57 software. The particular layout 
algorithm used for displaying networks is called stress minimization58, a technique developed as 
a version of techniques referred to as multidimensional scaling MDS. Borgatti (2009) defines 
MDS as “a method of locating points in space such that Euclidean distances [shortest paths] 
57  Version 2.7 downloaded from http://visone.info/html/download.html. This software is free and 
allows for visualizations as well various analyses. 
58 Stress minimization is the suggested layout algorithm by VISONE since it performs best 
among many other layouts at optimizing the following criteria:  (1) Links should have more or less the 
same length. (2) Nodes should be distributed well over the drawing area.( 3) the number of meaningless 
link crossings should be kept small.4 Structural symmetries in the network should be represented well.5 
the layout should reveal specific structural properties.6 given a sequence of networks, the layout should 
ease comparison with respect to the layout of the previous network in the sequence.From Visone Wiki at 
http://visone.info/wiki/index.php/Visualization_tab#stress_minimization. The last criterion is particularly 
important for the purposes of this study since some network types are visually categorized. 
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between the points correspond to a matrix of input similarities/distances used to provide visual 
representations of 1-mode matrices such as correlation matrices or perceptual distances among 
objects.” (pg.2) 
            One of the most serious challenges of this study is categorizing, differentiating the 
network structures of the cases into the pre-defined ideal type network types: Small World 
Networks, Hierarchical Networks, Elite Networks, Isolated Clique Networks, and Village 
Networks. I utilized various measures and techniques for the grouping of the networks into these 
categories. 
             My analyses showed that there were no networks that fit the Elite Network type. These 
networks are characterized by strong core/periphery structures as identified by Borgatti and 
Everett (1999). As discussed by Borgatti and Everett (1999), core-periphery networks are 
characterized by a few elite actors, and all other actors are connected through more or less 
closely around a single core. In order to detect that, I inspected the degree distributions of 
networks specifically looking for distributions characterized by a few hubs with lots of 
connections with high degree centrality and the remainder of the actors with very few 
connections. None of the 14 networks resemble such structure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 89 
Figure 17 Degree Distributions of Cases 
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  Figure 17 displays, the degree distributions Y-axes show the number of actors, and the 
X-axes show the value of degree centrality, that is, how many actors one is connected to. First , 
we can see that there is not much inequality in terms of having a group of elites with many 
connections, and peripheral actors with very few. Instead what we see is a fairly egalitarian 
distribution. In other words, even in large networks, there are no actors  with 20-30 connections 
and rest with a few connections. In other words, there are no cases in which the difference 
between a maximally connected actor and a minimally actor exceeds 2, ignoring the isolates-
actors with zero connections. Therefore I concluded that there was no elite type of network 
structure among the cases studied. 
 I hypothesize that the reason for this is due to the nature of the data. As previously 
mentioned, the data represent only alliance networks, there is no way to find out which 
organizations were the main organizers for each and every single event. In the presence of such 
directed data, it could be possible to analyze mobilization networks that are very likely to have 
core-periphery networks59.  
 My interviews also suggest that regardless of the number of organizations present, there 
is always a core group of actors that act as main organizers, communicating and making calls for 
other organizations to join the social movement event. Consequently, as a weakness of the study, 
I am able to analyze only alliance networks, which represent groups of organizations that may or 
may not act together for a common cause. 
 
 
59 Such networks are analyzed in Chapter VI.  
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Figure 18 Network Visualizations Cases I-V 
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Figure 19 Network Visualizations cases VI-X 
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Figure 20 Network Visualizations XI-XIV 
 
 
 
 
Through visual inspection of the network structure, it is possible to identify the presence 
of multiple Isolated Cliques types of structures. I identified cases # 3, 4, 8, and 13 as isolated 
cliques since the visualization clearly shows that these networks have very low levels of 
connectivity and they are highly fragmented structures. Network parameters displayed in Table 4 
also confirm this conclusion. Cases # 1,2,7,11,12 and 14 resemble a Village type of network 
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structure with one core single component characterized  by a high level of density and low levels 
of efficiency, as confirmed in Table XX.  
For Small World Networks and Hierarchical networks, it is hard to make use of 
visualizations for categorization. Therefore I solely relied on network parameters to categorize 
these types of networks as displayed in Table 4. Small World Networks are characterized by high 
levels of clustering and lower or similar levels of average path length (APL) in comparison to 
random networks with same density and size60. Case # 9 on animal rights is the only network 
that met the requirements to be labeled as a Small World Network.  
Finally, for hierarchy, I simply used Krackhardt’s (1994) measures of hierarchy: 
connectivity and efficiency61. Connectivity measures the reachability of each node, a 
connectivity value of “1” means the network is not fragmented, there are no isolates, and each 
actor is reachable to any other actor. Efficiency looks at the amount of redundancy that connects 
two ties. The higher the efficiency closer to “1” value implies the absence of redundant ties.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
60 Clustering of a network is the average of the densities of the neighborhoods of all of the actors 
also known as transitivity represents and APL is the average of all shortest paths between all possible 
dyads in a network Hanneman and Riddle, 2005. 
61 In addition to connectivity and hierarchy, Krackhardt 1994 uses two more measures, Least 
upper boundness, and Krackhardt hierarchy. These two measures are only relevant for directed networks 
and therefore are not used for analysis of the inter-organizational data that is available for this study.   
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Table 4 Network Parameters 
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As Butts (2005) states, a network cannot be considered if its density is larger than .5, 
since higher levels of density decrease the efficiency significantly. Based on measures of 
efficiency, connectivity, and density, Cases # 6 and 7 are categorized as hierarchical networks.  
4.3 MAJOR HYPOTHESES 
The structure of alliance networks does not have direct causal impact on the policy outcomes of 
social movements. Instead alliance networks are associated with other causal conditions that are 
likely to impact the outcomes. The first is the number of participant organizations. Protest events 
with a lot of participants demonstrate the presence of mass support for the challengers, and that 
alone should matter in democratic contexts. Moreover, such protests are more likely to attract 
media attention, and threaten the legitimacy of power holders and existing policies, hence they 
are likely to impose high levels of costs on power holders (Rojas, 2006; Della Porta and Diani, 
2006). Consequently the first major hypothesis is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  Successful policy outcomes are likely to be associated with subsets of 
social movements that have support from a large number of organizations. 
 
Secondly, I hypothesize that the mobilizations that are able to scale up from a local agenda 
to national in terms of being able to carry the debate to the national parliament and national 
media are more likely to succeed.  As an extremely centralized government system, the national 
public organizations in Turkey are always able to pressure and influence decision making at the 
local level. Therefore the second major hypothesis is as follows: 
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Hypothesis 2:  Successful policy outcomes are likely to be associated with subsets of   
 urban mobilizations that are able to generate public opinion and discussion at the 
national level  
4.3.1 Network Related Hypotheses 
As theoretically discussed, hierarchical networks  tend to more efficient; therefore in relation to 
participation related causal condition, I hypothesize that: 
  
Hypothesis 3:  Widespread participation is more likely to be associated with subsets of   
urban mobilizations that have hierarchical alliance networks.  
 
In relation to scaling up to the national level,  
 
Hypothesis 4:  Small world networks are more likely to be successful in terms of scaling 
up the debate, because these networks tend to link communities that each may have 
different pressure points and channels to raise their voices.  
4.3.2 Operationalizations of the Non-Network Causal Conditions  
Selection of causal conditions in QCA is based on substantive knowledge of cases, as well as on 
theoretical insights (Rihoux and Meur, 2008). Following are various causal conditions based on 
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major theories that explain the emergence and outcome of social movements, including, Political 
Opportunity Structures, Cultural Approaches, and Resource Mobilization Theories. 
 
Antagonist A: There are two main types of antagonists among the cases under study: public 
organizations and private organizations. Public organizations mostly consist of municipalities at 
different levels and despite previously discussed non-democratic context in local governments in 
Ankara, local governments are still expected to be more accountable and serve the interests of 
citizens in comparison to private institutions that are solely driven by profit maximization. 
Consequently, I expect cases in which the antagonist is a public organization to be more prone to 
be responsive to the demands of citizens and end with successful outcomes compared to cases in 
which the antagonist is a private organization. This condition is coded as 1 (one) for public 
organizations as antagonists and 0 (zero) for cases when the antagonist is a private organization. 
 
The Presence or Absence of Elite Allies E: Alliance with the elites is considered present in a 
case when a political party in the parliament supports the movement by participating at 
movement events. If a political party in the parliament participates in at least one movement 
event, that case is considered to have elite support. I anticipate that elite support will be 
associated with successful political outcomes. 
 
Direct Beneficiaries B: All cases under study have support from conscience adherents, groups 
that do not have immediate interest in the outcome of the movement. Unions, professional 
organizations e.g. Chamber of Architects, Chamber of Physicians, advocacy NGOs constitute 
most of the conscience adherents in the cases. But only certain cases have direct beneficiaries as 
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in the case of groups resisting urban renewal projects. These groups have a lot of support from 
conscience adherents, but because the outcomes have very dramatic effects on the livelihood of 
the people that are victims of these projects, these groups show strong resistance and do not 
refrain from confronting the police or other public officials despite high risks. Consequently, 
when such groups define the nature of the case, I expect successful outcomes due to increased 
levels of commitment and solidarity among the participants. 
 
Scaling Up to the National Level N: For these conditions, I consider for each case whether the 
issue was discussed at the Parliament, and whether this discussion was covered in the national 
news media.  
 
Participation: The number of participating organizations in various social movement events is 
considered as a proxy measure for the size of participation for each movement. This condition is 
coded as low 0, medium 2, high 3.62 
 
Table 5 is the data table, and provides details of conditions and cases before the data is 
transformed into a truth table. Next, Table 6 is the truth table that summarizes the cases. The 
truth tables’ each row shows an empirically observed combination of causal conditions and 
outcomes for the Model I, the first stage of the causal model introduced previously (Ragin, 
2008). 
 
 
62 See Appendix XX for the details of the calibration of this condition.  
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Table 5 Raw Data Matrix 
 
 
 
4.4 ANALYSIS 
Due to the nature of the data, Multi-Value QCA (mvQCA) is used as the data analysis technique. 
mvQCA can be considered as an extension of crisp QCA (Cronqvist and Berg-Schlosser, 2009). 
The main difference between mvQCA and traditional crisp QCA is that mvQCA allows 
incorporating nominal and ordinal level measures to be included as causal conditions, in addition 
to the dichotomous ones (Cronvist, 2003; 2007). Consequently, mvQCA avoids loss of 
information and decreases the chances of observing contradictory configurations (Cronqvist and 
Berg-Schlosser, 2009). Yet, the outcome condition in mvQCA still needs to be coded as a 
dichotomous one (Cronvist, 2003; 2007). 
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 Minimization process in mvQCA is also similar to the process in crisp QCA. Ragin 
(1987) summarizes the reduction process in crisp QCA as follows:  “if two Boolean expressions 
differ in only one causal condition, yet produce the same outcome, then the causal condition that 
distinguishes the two expressions can be considered irrelevant and can be removed to create a 
simpler, combined expression” (p.93), cited in Rihoux and De Meur, (2009). In other words, 
causal condition A is not included in the reduced expression, if absence and presence of A in 
combination with the same causal conditions lead to the same outcome. In mvQCA, a causal 
condition is removed from the reduced expression if all possible values of this condition in 
combination with the same causal conditions are associated with same outcome (Cronqvist and 
Berg-Schlosser, 2009.) For example in crips QCA condition A is considered irrelevant if: 
 
aBC  + ABC  O 
 
Meaning, the absence of A in combination with the presence of B and C, and the 
presence of A in combination with the presence of B and C lead to the same outcome. Therefore 
A can be removed from the formula BC 0.  Now, if we assume A and B are dichotomous 
conditions, and C is a three valued condition, C can be reduced only if all three values of C are 
combined with the same values for A and B as shown in the hypothetical example below; 
 
A1B0C0 + A1B0C1+ A1B0C2  O 
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The example shows, if C has any of the three values it can get in combination with the 
presence of A and presence of B, the outcome does not change. Hence, the formula can be 
reduced to: 
A1B0  O 
 
All analysis is carried out in R environment using the QCA package written by Dusa and 
Miller (2013). 
4.4.1 Model I- Outcome = Success/Failure 
The first model analyses the direct causal conditions including presence of elites, nature of the 
antagonist, presence of beneficiaries, and participation. Table 6, the truth table for this model 
summarizes the combination of causal conditions associated with successful outcomes.  
 
Table 6 Truth Table for Model I 
 
 
 103 
 The clearest pattern in the truth table is the presence of elite alliance and public organization as 
the main antagonist in all recipes that end with successful outcomes. No contradictory cases are 
present. Overall there are 7 cases with successful outcomes, and 7 cases with non-successful 
policy outcomes. 
 
Table 7 Boolean Minimization Results for Model I 
 
 
 
             Figure 21 summarizes the two different causal paths that have successful outcomes 
based on the Boolean minimization.63As expected from the truth table, presence of elite alliance 
and public organization as the main antagonists are the two major causal conditions present in 
both paths. The first path combines these two causal conditions with the presence of direct 
beneficiaries, which indicates that highly motivated organizations’ individuals only succeed 
when their efforts are combined with support from elites and when a more accountable 
antagonist is presence. Next path shows that up scaling and wide spread participation need to co-
exist in addition to the first two causal conditions 
 
63 As suggested by Ragin (2008), intermediate solutions are used. 
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Figure 21 Causal Paths for Model I 
 
 
 
This path displays the causal complexity between up scaling and wide spread 
participation, in the sense that neither of the two paths alone is sufficient for successful 
outcomes, unlike the presence of a group of highly motivated actors. In a way, less committed 
but larger groups need to scale up the debate about the movement for successful outcomes.  
Next models look at how network structure interacts with these two last causal 
conditions, since other conditions are endogenous characteristic of each movement. The alliance 
structure may not affect the presence of direct beneficiaries, elite allies or the nature of the 
antagonist.   
4.4.2 Model II-Outcome= Participation 
 Model II looks at how causal conditions interact and lead to wide spread participation. 
The truth table summarizes the causal combinations without the logical remainders. Model II 
also introduces a new causal condition, presence or absence of vertical or horizontal integration. 
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This condition is based on whether the movement was able to forge ties with similar horizontal 
movements and different vertical movements in other cities and locales. 
 
Table 8 Truth Table for Model II 
 
 
The truth table shows that this model is not very strong due to lack of conditional diversity; there 
is only one network structure that resembles Small World Networks, and only 3 cases that were 
able to mobilize wide spread participation.  
 
Table 9 Boolean Minimization Results for Model II 
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Despite weak model fit, the two causal paths suggest that hierarchical networks, and small world 
networks are both efficient in mobilizing large number of participants, when commitments are 
high, the movement works together with other mobilizations, and also when elites are present.  
 
Figure 22 Causal Paths for Model II 
 
 
4.4.3 Model III-Outcome =National Agenda 
The last model in this chapter looks at what factors work together to facilitate the scaling up of 
the issue that is the main concern of the movement. 
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Table 10 Truth Table for Model III 
 
 
 
The last model includes the Antagonist Public (A) condition, since mobilizations 
towards public organizations are more likely to rise to the national agenda. There are 7 cases that 
were able to move their cause to the national level while the remaining 5 were limited to the 
local level. 
 
Table 11 Boolean Minimization Results for Model III 
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Figure 23 Causal Paths for Model III 
 
 
 
Similar to the Model II, the main causal paths are only differentiated by the presence of Small 
World Networks or Hierarchical Networks. Both paths require the presence of elite allies, with 
public organizations as the main antagonists. Next, these two causal conditions are combined 
either by presence of direct beneficiaries, or with presence of integration with other movements. 
This pattern may be explained by the power of the presence of individuals that are directly 
affected by the issue at hand, as is the case with resistance movements towards urban renewal 
projects. The dramatic stories of individuals and families are more likely to be captivated by the 
national media as well as in the Parliament. In the absence of groups of people that put a human 
face to the issue, it appears that better organization is needed either in the form of horizontal or 
vertical integration.  
 Overall, the findings suggest that, within the case of Turkey, political opportunity 
structure-related causal conditions are more powerful and necessary in understanding policy 
outcomes of urban movements. As highlighted in the literature (e.g. Arsla, 1999 and Ozbudun, 
1993), it appears that the power dynamics among the state elites still mostly dominate the 
political landscape in Turkey.  When the opportunity structure is not favorable, different forms of 
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organizing or strategies do not seem to be relevant in facilitating successful policy outcomes. 
This finding also shows support for the poor state of local democracy in Turkey since if there are 
no elite allies the governance system seems to be unresponsive to the demands of the citizens. 
 With regard to network structure, the findings do not suggest a strong role for network 
structure. Network structure appears important to a certain extent when the external environment 
is conducive to the realization of the movement goals. Results suggest that both small world 
networks and hierarchical networks are efficient in terms of mobilizing large numbers of people 
and in promoting a debate about the issue at the national level.  
4.5 SUMMARY 
This chapter aimed at looking at the role of variation in the network structure on the role of 
policy outcomes of urban movements in Ankara between 2006-2011. The chapter provided 
descriptive accounts for all of the 14 cases. Next, it provided a short discussion of Multi-Value 
QCA that is the major data analysis technique used in this chapter.  
 Chapter IV also focused on the operationalizations of different network structures under 
the 5 ideal type network structures discussed in the second chapter. Analyses of network 
parameters revealed that there were no networks that resembled opinion leader networks, also 
known as core/periphery networks, and each case’s network structure was categorized into the 
four remaining categories: Small World Network, Hierarchical Network, Isolated Cliques, and 
Village Networks. 
 Further analyses showed that network structures, or alliance structures mattered when 
political opportunity structures were favorable for the movement to succeed. The findings 
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showed the significant role played by the elites in accordance with the literature on Turkish 
politics.  
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5.0  URBAN MOVEMENT NETWORKS IN ANKARA: A WHOLISTIC LOOK AT 
THE GLOBAL STRUCTURE, SIGNIFICANT ACTORS, AND EMERGENCE 
MECHANISMS 
This chapter aims at providing a comprehensive analysis of the larger complete network of 
SMOs involved in urban movements in Ankara between 2006 and 2011. In order to achieve this 
analysis, the first section reports  descriptive characteristics of the merged network of fourteen 
cases discussed in the previous chapter. The following section identifies the crucial actors and 
discusses their specific roles and functions. The final section offers explanations for the 
emergence and strength of ties among SMOs using regression analysis. 
5.1 THE STRUCTURE OF URBAN MOVEMENT NETWORKS IN ANKARA, 2006-
2011 
 
Manuel Castells in his renowned analysis of urban movements, The City and the Grassroots  
(1983) defined urban movements as “urban-orientated mobilizations that influence structural 
social change and transform the urban meanings” (pg. 305). Unlike his previous works that 
mostly regarded urban movements as the crystallized forms of contradictions in the capitalistic 
mode of production, in The City and the Grassroots Castells conceptualized urban movements 
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within three sometimes overlapping lines of contestations: collective consumption public 
services/ infrastructure issues, territorial identities minorities, and contesting of state power. 
Castells argued that these divided localized particularities weakened the power of urban 
movements to achieve meaningful social change at larger scales.  
In order to understand and ameliorate these limitations of urban movements, Nicholls 
(2008) argues that we first need a better conception and analyses of how complex cities function 
and when networked urban mobilizations are more effective. Without naming the structure of 
urban movements in cities as Small World Networks, Nicholls (2008) actually argues that the 
“strength of successful urban movements lies at their ability to optimize strong-weak tie coalition 
structures “(pg. 856). More specifically he states: 
 
“Cities stimulate the formation of diverse groups with strong ties. These strong ties 
enable actors in these groups to pool and concentrate high-grade resources to address 
particular concerns. …However, the rich and diverse resources found in complex cities can 
only yield their advantages when weaker ties or bridges are built between different groups. 
Location in a common urban system facilitates bridging opportunities because actors have 
better information of the resources and organizations ‘out there’, there is a greater 
availability of brokers to establish contacts between different groups, and it facilities the 
transposition of resources from one context to the other. Thus the specific role of the city for 
general social movements is in its function as a relational incubator, facilitating complex 
relational exchanges that generate a diversity of useful resources for campaigns operating at 
a variety of spatial scales”(pg. 841-842). 
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Were localized urban movements of Ankara able to form such a larger structure that 
connected different social groups with diverse resources and string ties through weak ties 
across different movements?  
 
Figure 24 Networks of Urban Movements in Ankara Combined64 
 
 
 
The network map clearly shows that most mobilizations are connected to each other 
through organizations that participate in more than one case, because the network mostly consists 
of one large component, and very few organizations that are not linked to the main component. 
64 The master network data was attained by simply combining all fourteen networks. The 
common organizations in different cases connect different movements.  
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In other words, it is possible to talk about a larger network of organizations in Ankara 
that are reachable to each other easily through organizations that function as bridges, or brokers 
across subgroups that are highly clustered. It is still hard to claim whether the network structure 
resembles a Small World Network, or some other type based on simple visual inspection. 
Therefore, Table 12 presents basic descriptive parameters of the merged network. 
Table 12 Network Parameters 
 
 
 
The network parameters indicate that the merged network is a highly efficient one, and 
almost fully connected and has density below .50. These features indicate that the merged 
network closely resembles a hierarchical network. The clustering coefficient of the network is 
.61, more than 3 times, if the network were a random one65 with same size and density. With 
65 Random networks are generated using igraph package in R based on Erdos Renyi 
random graph models N=10,000. 
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regard to average path length, the average geodesic distance between two actors in the network, 
the merged network has a much larger value in comparison to the random average path length. 
According to Watts and Strogatz (1998), small world networks tend to have similar 
average path length to random networks, whereas the global clustering coefficient of small world 
networks is much larger compared to random networks. The Small World Ratio66, calculated as 
the ratio of the observed clustering coefficient to random clustering coefficient divided by the 
ratio of observed average path length to the random average path length is 2.22. According to 
Kilduff et al. (2008), the threshold value for a Small World Ratio is around 4.75, much higher 
than the observed value. 
5.1.1 Identifying Prominent Actors 
The most obvious technique to identify significant actors is to analyze organizations’ centrality 
scores. Three main centrality scores are used for this task: 
 
 (1) Degree Centrality: number of other actors to which one is connected (Freeman, 1978). 
Degree centrality is a powerful measure to signify the connectedness of an actor locally, but it is 
limited when it comes to indicating the significance of an actor globally, since one can have 
many links in a subgroup that is peripherally located in the network.  
(2) Betweennesss Centrality: quantifies the degree to which an actor lies on the shortest paths 
that connect two actors that may otherwise would not be connected. An actor may have low 
66 Small World Ratio=  
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degree centrality, but his/her connections may be very crucial by connecting groups of actors that 
are not connected to each other (Freeman, 1978). 
 
 (3) Eigen Vector Centrality: measure how well ones’ alters are connected to the other actors. 
Eigenvector centrality is determined not only by actors’ immediate connections as is the case 
with degree centrality, but also considers how well-connected these immediate connections are 
to the rest of the actors in the network using an iterative algorithm. Therefore, Eigenvector 
centrality provides a more global perspective of a node’s position in a network and considers the 
effect of indirect ties as well (Bonacich 2007). 
 These three measures tend to be highly correlated with each other (Valente, 2008). In 
other words, actors that have many connections tend to lie as bridges across different groups, and 
also are likely to be important to other actors in the network.  
 
Table 13 Correlation Matrix for Centrality Measures 
 
 ** .  Correlation is significant at .01 level. 
 
 
  The correlation matrix reveals that only eigenvector centrality and degree centrality are 
strongly correlated whereas the correlation between betweennesss and degree centrality, and the 
correlation between the eigenvector centrality and betweennesss centrality are moderately 
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correlated. The latter correlations suggest that some organizations have high level of variance 
with regard to their centrality measures.  
In order to identify such organizations, I plotted the latter relations using a scatter plot, 
and determined outlier organizations visually.  
 
Figure 25 Scatter Plot: Eigen Vector X Degree Centralities 
 
 
The red arrow signifies the outlier organizations that have high degree centrality relative to their 
Eigen vector centrality. In other words, these organizations have working relations with many 
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organizations but they are not very well connected to the whole network. All four organizations 
are NGOs that specialize in animal rights.  
This observation demonstrates the fact that the most central organizations within the 
animal rights movement in Ankara are not very much involved with the activities of other types 
of mobilizations. This finding also confirms my overall observation that the mobilization 
towards animal rights is extremely well organized, with support from both international and 
national organizations, but fails to create bridges with other mobilizations. 
 
Figure 26 Scatter Plot: Degree X Betweennesss Centralities 
 
 
The second scatter plot demonstrates that most organizations tend to have very low 
betweennesss centrality, in other words most of the actors in the network do not function as 
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bridges across subgroups. The red arrows signify two organizations that have relatively high 
levels of betweennesss centrality, especially with regard to their level of degree centralities. 
These organizations can be considered as two important organizations with high levels of 
bridging function across different movements.  
 These two organizations are the Republican People’s Party (CHP), the main opposition 
party, and Ankara Medical Chamber (ATO). The first one is the main opposition party, and the 
high betweennesss ranking of the CHP suggests that the CHP is actively participating in a variety 
of mobilizations in Ankara. The main antagonists in most mobilizations are the municipalities 
headed by the members of AKP (Justice and Development Party). Therefore the extensive 
participation of CHP in urban movements in Ankara can be interpreted more as involvement 
with larger political agenda.  
 The Ankara Medical Chamber is a professional organization that was founded to protect 
the rights of the medical community in the 1950s, but it is among many other professional 
organizations that function as the most effective SMOs in Turkey due to unique historical and 
social processes that will be discussed shortly.  
Table 14 shows the top ten ranking organizations for each of the three-centrality measures. 
Similar to the previous discussion, one apparent pattern in the lists is the high frequency of 
professional organizations. The obvious question is how did professional organizations that were 
established to protect and promote the interests of certain professional communities become such 
prominent civil society actors in Turkey? 
 
Table 14 Top Ranking Organizations Based On Centrality Scores 
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Table 14 shows the top ten ranking organizations for each of the three-centrality measures. 
Similar to the previous discussion, one apparent pattern in the lists is the high frequency of 
professional organizations. The obvious question is how did professional organizations that were 
established to protect and promote the interests of certain professional communities become such 
prominent civil society actors in Turkey? 
All chambers included in the study are members of The Union of Chambers of Turkish 
Engineers and Architects TMMOB that was established in 1954. Currently TMMOB has 24 
Chambers, 194 branches in various cities of Turkey, with more than 410.000 members67. A short 
look at the website of TMMOB demonstrates the highly politicized nature of TMMOB, with 
many references to democracy and equality, and emphasis on public service instead of stressing 
the interests of its members in defining the goal and the purposes of the organization. 
67 For more information on TMMOB in English see: 
http://www.tmmob.org.tr/index_en.php 
 121 
                                                 
According to Batuman (2008) these urban professionals became very much involved in the 
building the new modern Turkey through the dominant statist development approach following 
the birth of the new Republic, and they were especially politicized in 1960s as a result of their 
involvement with gecekondu struggles, as well as the result of  high levels of mobilization in 
urban settings in Turkey in the 1960s and ‘70s.  
Batuman (2008) likens especially the urban architects and planners in Turkey between 
1960 and 1980 to Gramsci’s (1971) famous organic intellectuals that “function in the building of 
the hegemony of their respective class with which they are ‘organically’ linked” (pg. 1927). 
Similarly, another possible explanation is the socialization of young urban professionals in 1960s 
at technical universities such as Middle East Technical University in Ankara that were the foci of 
political mobilizations in 1960s.  
Another crucial organization that deserves attention is People’s Houses (Halk Evleri)68 that 
were  first established as community centers focusing on culture and educational services all over  
Turkey by the state in the 1940s. When People’s Houses were first established, they were mostly 
a social engineering project to educate and modernize the citizens of the young Republic 
(Lamprou, 2009; and Simsek, 2005). The organization was shut down twice for enabling 
political mobilization that was at odds with ruling governments at the time.  
In 1983, People’s Houses were opened as an association that works in working class 
neighborhoods around the country on various issues including health, labor rights, empowerment 
of women and education. Most notably People’s Houses have been effectively working in 
mobilizing against urban renewal projects. It is an extremely effective organization that has 
branches in most working class neighborhoods of Ankara and other big cities around Turkey. 
68 http://www.halkevleri.org.tr/ 
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People’s Houses work extensively to unite local mobilizations at distant locales through people’s 
councils and national meetings.   
Kavakliderem is another notable organization in the lists, and it is the only  local 
community organization that participates in many social movement events in various issue areas 
that acts as a bridging organization between groups of organization that mostly focus on single 
issues. 
5.2 EXPLAINING TIE STRENGTH AMONG ORGANIZATIONS: A MULTIPLE 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS USING QUADRATIC ASSIGNMENT PROCEDURE 
The final section of the chapter aims at explaining the variation in tie strength among 
organizations that were active in urban movements in Ankara between 2006 and 2011. In other 
words, this section asks what factors explain why some organizations extensively work together; 
participate in social movement events together, whereas  others do not. 
5.2.1 Multiple Regression Quadratic Assignment Procedure (MRQAP) 
MRQAP is a permutation-based non-parametric test that is similar to Ordinary Least Squares 
OLS regression that is suitable for interdependent data (Dekker, Krackhardt, and Snijders, 2007; 
and Krackhardt, 1988). The presence of independent observations is one of the main assumptions 
of OLS regression as in most standard parametric tests, and failure to meet this assumption is 
likely to produce biased, deflated standard errors that tend to produce erroneous statistical 
significance (Krackhardt, 1988). 
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Social network data almost always violates the independence assumption since the main 
premise of the social network approach is that we can’t understand the social world simply by 
looking at the attributes and characteristic of factors (e.g. Do more educated persons tend to earn 
more income?); instead we need to look at the relations among actors to understand 
differences/similarities in social phenomena (e.g. do people with higher social capital tend to 
earn more?).   A social network approach emphasizes the role of structure and relations in 
shaping outcomes. Therefore the assumption of independence is not only violated in studies 
analyzing the role of networks, a social network researcher is primarily interested in extracting 
the information that is present in the structure of dependencies among units being analyzed.  
The input variables for MRQAP are square matrices for each independent and dependent 
variable. Vector variables can easily be converted into actor-to-actor matrices that show 
similarities/differences or distances for each dyad in the network. For categorical variables, 
actors in the same category would get a value of 1 at their intersection cell in the matrix xij, and a 
value of 0 if they do not belong to the same category. Similarly, a distance matrix can be created 
for continuous variables by assigning the absolute differences of the values of the variable for 
each dyad. Let's say A is 22 years old, and B is 19; the intersection cell of A and B in the 
distance matrix would get a value of 3. 
MRQAP algorithm first performs a standard OLS regression by considering each 
corresponding cell in input matrices as an observation. Next, random matrices of the dependent 
variable are created as a result of the random permutation of the existing matrix corresponding 
columns and rows kept together. Each permutation is followed by a regression analysis, similar 
to the OLS regression performed in the beginning. This process is carried out thousands of times, 
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usually at least 1000 times or more, and the distribution of the regression coefficients replaces 
the distribution of the null hypothesis that would normally be based on deflated standard errors. 
 The distribution of regression coefficients coming from the simulation analysis is then 
used to estimate standard errors for the regression coefficients. If the probability of observing the 
actual regression coefficients calculated with the original dependent variable matrix in the 
beginning is small enough, we can reject the null for a given regression coefficient (see Gibbons 
and Olk, 2003 for more details). 
5.2.2 Model Description 
The first group of independent variables includes network related variables and consists of 
difference matrices created for betweennesss, degree, and eigenvector centralities. The network 
related independent variables aim at testing assortativity related hypotheses. Assortativity related 
mechanisms emerge in social networks when actors with similar structural properties tend to 
form connections with each other (Rivera et. al 2010). In other words, assortativity related 
hypotheses test whether structurally important actors are more likely to build ties with each 
other. 
The correlation matrix in Table 15 demonstrates that none of the centrality related 
variables are weakly correlated with the dependent variable matrix based on tie strength. As 
expected there is strong correlation between eigenvector centrality matrix and degree centrality 
matrix. Therefore, these two matrices are not included in the same model; instead two different 
models are run for each of them. 
 
Table 15 Correlations among Centrality Matrices 
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**. Significant at .01 Level; * Significant at .05 Level 
 
The second group of variables is derived from the attributes of organizations involved in 
the network. These group of variables tests hypotheses on homophily and heterophily related 
mechanisms. Homophily can be defined as the strong tendency in social networks that contact 
between similar actors in the network is likely to be more frequent than contact with dissimilar 
actors (McPerson et al. 2001). According to McPerson et al. (2001) “homophily means that 
cultural, behavioral, genetic, or material information that flows through networks will tend to be 
localized” (p.416).  
In addition to homophily, recent studies show that heterophily, the tendency to form ties 
with diverse actors, may also be at work in the formation process of network ties. Especially 
complex problems require a degree of heterogeneity to allow room for innovative approaches as 
well as integration of diverse material and non-material resources that are available to 
heterogeneous group of actors. As Page (2007) states “[t]he simple facts of the matter are that 
when society confronts difficult problems—putting people on the moon, curing diseases, 
designing new products, crafting changes in the tax code—we create teams of diverse people” 
(pg. 322, cited in Rivera et al. 2010). Consequently, homophily based tie formation may be 
effective in situations that require high levels of trust, risk taking behavior and high levels of 
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solidarity, whereas heterophily mechanism dominated networks are more likely to effective in 
solving long term policy related problems. 
The first of these attribute based variables is a dichotomous variable that indicates 
whether an organization functions in a single-issue area, or more than one issue area coded as 
single or multiple based on goal statement of each organization.  
The second of these variables is generated based on the level of jurisdiction that each 
organization operates. This variable consist of five categories, (1) Local: for organizations that 
function within a local administrative unit within Ankara, (2) City: for organizations that operate 
within Ankara, (3) National: for organizations that have operations in more than two cities in 
Turkey, (4) International: for organizations that are based outside of Turkey, and (5) Other: for 
organizations that operate at city level in cities other than Ankara in Turkey. 
The final categorical variable is generated based on the primary issue area that an 
organization works in such housing, human rights, animal rights, gender etc. as displayed in 
Table 16 . 
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Table 16 Distributions of Organizations by Categorical Variables 
 
 
 
5.2.3 Results of the MRQAP Analysis 
MRQAP analysis is carried out in R environment using the “netlm” function in SNA package 
(Butt, 2013).  
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Table 17 displays the results of the analysis for two separate models due to the high 
multicollinearity problem between Eigen vector centrality and degree centrality. 
 
Table 17 MRQAP Results 
 
 
*. Significant at .05 level. **Significant at .01 level, Two-tailed 
 
Both models yielded very similar results. All organizational attributes are significant at 
.01 level have positive coefficients. This finding is supports the homophily argument for 
organizational characteristics due to the positive sign of the coefficients. If the coefficient were 
negative, in any of the three variables, there would be some evidence of heterophily. In other 
words, most organizations in the merged network tend to work with organizations that operate at 
same level of jurisdiction, and share similar functions and purposes.  
For the network related centrality variables, negative sign of the coefficients indicate 
presence of assortativity because the values in centrality matrices represent absolute value of the 
differences for each dyad of actors. If there were presence of the assortativity mechanism, we 
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would expect small values in centrality matrices; smaller distances denote similar centrality 
measures and a high number of co-presence in SMO activities as measured by the merged matrix 
of urban movements.  
The assortativity seems to be present only for eigenvector centrality; the organizations 
that are connected to other organizations that are well connected to the network tend to be 
connected with each other as well. The sign for degree centrality coefficient is also negative, but 
was not significant only at .10 alpha level. This suggests similar assortativity phenomena may be 
work with degree centrality, but statistical evidence is limited for such a conclusion. 
For betweennesss centrality, the coefficient sign is positive and significant, implying that 
organizations that have high levels of difference in their betweennesss scores tend to work 
together. In other words, organizations that act as bridges across subgroups tend not to be 
connected to other organizations with similar bridging functions.  
Overall, both models have relatively small-adjusted R square values, suggesting limited 
model fit. The low adjusted R square value may indicate that the models may be missing   
important mechanisms as variables that may explain the variation in the tie formation and tie 
strength. 
5.2.4 Some Alternative Explanations 
My interviews with activists suggest that reciprocity is an important norm in shaping 
organizations’ decisions to participate in various social movement events. While the level of 
analysis in this chapter is the organization, organizations are still made up of human beings who 
are very receptive to the issue of reciprocity. If an event is outside the main domain of an 
organization, the decision to participate is not only determined by how much that particular 
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organization cares about the cause, but also based on members’ previous experience with the 
main organizers of the event, more specifically whether they had participated in  earlier events 
planned by the same event organizers or not. 
 Consequently, the personal aspect that shapes tie strength could be better captured with a 
data set that has directed data instead of symmetric that is used in this analysis, It is not possible 
to derive this type of data from newspaper articles, since newspaper articles rarely mention who 
were the main organizers of the events, and which organizations were merely responding to the 
call made by these main organizers. 
 In addition to the reciprocity factor, it is possible that ties among organizations may be 
formed as a result of unique historical and social circumstances in the past, and the current 
structure is also a function of these path dependencies. A longitudinal, panel data set may work 
better to identify the specific path dependent mechanisms in understanding tie formation among 
actors. 
5.3 SUMMARY 
Chapter V focused on the analysis of the overall network structure of social movement 
organizations by merging networks of all fourteen cases analyzed separately in chapter IV.  Such 
an approach enables a more holistic look at the action field of the social movement organizations 
in Ankara between 2006 and 2011.  
 The first section concentrated on the network parameters of the merged network, and 
based on high efficiency and low-density scores showed that the merged network mostly 
resembled a hierarchical network.  
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The next section performed a centrality-based analysis to identify the most significant 
actors in the network. Professional organizations such as the Chamber of Architects, Chamber of 
Urban Planners, and Chamber of Environmental Engineers appeared to be the most central 
organizations. 
 The final section presented the findings of MRQAP analyses and reported the presence of 
homophily mechanisms based on organizational attributes, and the limited presence of 
assortativity based on Eigen vector centrality. The final section also suggests alternative 
explanations for tie formation, such as reciprocity and path dependence that were not tested due 
to the nature of the data used in the analysis.  
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6.0  INTERPERSONAL NETWORKS AND PROTEST EVENTS AT 
NEIGHBORHOOD LEVEL 
Interpersonal network based cases are considerably different from the previously discussed urban 
movements that are mostly characterized by inter-organizational networks. These collective 
action events69 do not qualify as social movements due to two main reasons: First, almost all 
cases lack temporal continuity. As McAdam and Snow (2010) state, the word movement 
suggests a social phenomenon that develops over time. The collective action cases that are 
studied in this chapter mostly consist of short-lived neighborhood level protests; they emerge and 
conclude in a matter of a few hours, or a few days at most.  
Secondly, most of these cases are not professionally organized activities. Since the 
resource mobilization approach emerged in the late 1970s, the organized activity aspect of social 
movements gained significance. According to McAdam and Snow (2010), there are almost no 
social movements that are not associated with any kind of formal or informal SMOs. The reason 
is the need for professional approach to organizing in order to achieve a degree of continuity.  
Therefore, the absence or presence of SMOs constitutes a fundamental component in the 
conceptualization of social movements. While some of the cases analyzed in this section have a 
69 Since most of the collective actions events examined in this chapter consist of one or 
two protest events, I will use collective action events and protest events interchangeably.   
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local SMO involved in the organizing processes, most cases lack any formal or informal 
organizations.  
Another common characteristic across most of the collective action events based on 
interpersonal networks is the spontaneity of the protests. According to Rosenthal and Schwartz 
(1989): “Spontaneity in social movement refers to an impromptu action or series of actions 
undertaken by collectivity” (pg. 40). A more precise one, Gemici’s (2003) conceptualization that 
identifies two main characteristics of spontaneity during social protests:  mobilization without a 
prior planning, and emergence of the protest group in a short period of time.  
The prevalence of spontaneity70 across the protest events is not surprising since most of 
these protests are mobilizations to halt the construction of cellular towers that require immediate 
action. As most of my respondents mentioned during our interviews, it is much easier to stop 
construction of a cellular tower in comparison to make authorities demolish cellular towers. Not 
surprisingly, in general social movements are more likely to succeed if the protagonists can 
mobilize before a policy decision and implementation take place since the reversal of already 
existing policies require more complex legal processes, and participation of larger and more 
diverse number of actors in the process.  
The issue of spontaneity raises another important matter in the study of collective action: 
the role of spatial environments at facilitating and/or hindering collective action. The spatiality of 
different forms of collective action has become an increasing focus of social scientists across 
70 One may consider the community-organizing model suggested by Saul Alinsky (1971) 
to understand the cases analyzed in this chapter. However, the community organizing suggested 
by Alinksy in 1960s in US has a substantially different context in comparison to the cases under 
study. Most importantly, due to the prominence of spontaneity and self-organization in the cases 
that are focus of this chapter.  
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disciplines in recent years, most notably among geographers, sociologists, and political scientists 
(see Featherstone and Kopf, 2012 for an extensive review). 
 Space especially among sociologists, has been commonly conceptualized as a type of 
social structure such as economic, social, and political structures (Sewell, 2001; Zhao, 1998; 
Tilly, 2000; and Martin and Miller, 2003). Therefore researchers understand and analyze space in 
the same way as they study other types of structures, both as a product of the interaction of social 
agents, and as a constraint on  social action. In a similar tone with complexity theory, Sewell 
(2001) explains this relationship as follows: “Spatial structures, like other sorts of structures, are 
durable and constraining, but they also are subject to transformation as a consequence of the very 
social action that they shape” (Pg.55). Likewise Massey (1984) argues: “Spatial distributions and 
geographical differentiation may be the result of social processes, but they also affect how those 
processes work. ‘The spatial’ is not just an outcome; it is also part of the explanation.” (pg. 4, 
cited in Martin and Miller, 2003) 
The obvious question that follows is through what mechanisms do space and collective 
action interact and affect each other. According to Sewell (2001) space mostly matters in terms 
of determining co-presence, because increasing co-presence is what most collective action efforts 
strive to achieve as a pre-requisite for success. Evidently, the physical environment plays an 
important role at facilitating or hindering co-presence, particularly within the context of 
spontaneous neighborhood protest events.  
By determining co-presence, spatial arrangements may also have a crucial impact on the 
formation and nature of social networks that are shown to be the basis of mobilization in 
numerous collective action events (e.g. Zhao, 1998; Futrell and Simi, 2004). As Zhao (1998) 
states, space matters to understand mobilization processes during collective action, because “.. it 
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determines the structure and strength of social networks as well as the spatial position and 
routine activities of people in a community” (pg. 195). For example, Zhao (1998) in his analysis 
of the 1989 student movements in Beijing showed that the spatial configuration of campuses in 
Beijing facilitated the spread of dissident ideas and communication about movement activities, 
and the densely populated life in the dormitories led to the development of strong networks 
among students that fostered high levels of participation by enhancing the psychological and 
social costs of not participating.  
Similarly, in the case of the inter-personal network based protest events analyzed in this 
chapter, it is evident that the spatial arrangements had an important role in shaping the structure 
of mobilization networks as well as the strength of ties that make up these social networks.  
While the analysis shows that network structure and nature of tie strength matter in explaining 
the outcomes of the protest events under study, certain network structures are also associated 
with successful outcomes through different processes.  
6.1 DESCRIPTION OF CASES 
There are overall 17 cases, 12 of which are about the removal or stopping the construction of 
cellular towers. The high frequency of cellular tower related neighborhood mobilizations is not a 
unique social phenomenon to Ankara. Despite lack of reliable evidence about the adverse health 
effects of cellular towers, there is a commonly held belief in Turkey that being close to cellular 
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towers is associated with high levels of risk for cancer71. Recent research on the potential health 
risks of cellular towers shows that cellular towers may carry physiological, even sometimes 
physical side effects through a mechanism called nocebo effect (Khurana et al. 2010). Similar  
 to placebo effect, nocebo effect takes place when a neutral treatment causes negative effects on 
the respondents when they believe that the treatment will lead to an undesired condition.  
The main public institution that regulates cellular towers, the Information and 
Communication Technologies Authority BTK (2013), also states that as long as the transmitted 
radiofrequency (RF) levels remain within the legal limits, cellular towers do not pose any health 
risks. Yet, there are increasing numbers of legal cases against unwanted cellular towers all 
around Turkey, and court decisions for these cases are rather conflicting.  
While some courts decide that cellular towers may pose a threat to human health and 
should not be built in close proximity to residential areas, others ruled that cellular towers are 
safe as long as they abide by the BTK regulations. The court decisions are not binding for the 
companies in the sense that they can immediately build another tower in the close proximity of 
the removed towers. As will be discussed shortly, only successful mobilizations keep the 
contested space cellular tower free even after the court decision.  
The remaining 5 cases are on a wide range of issues: a mobilization to reverse the 
decision to change street names, a protest event to compel the municipality to rebuild an 
overpass that was taken down during road construction, multiple protests to facilitate the repair 
of street lights, mobilization targeting the proposal to build an amusement park, and protests 
71 Despite advice and reports from experts, most of the public in Turkey continues to believe that 
cellular towers can be deadly. During my interviews, I met with many individuals who believed that 
certain cancer cases among their neighbors in their buildings were caused by nearby cellular towers. 
There are even attempts for nation wide organizing against cellular towers. The following website 
demonstrates such an attempt where cellular tower victims from all over Turkey post messages about 
their problems and struggles. http://www.bazistasyonuistemiyoruz.com/ 
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against the relocation of an inter-city bus stop. Next section provides a short summary 
description of the mobilization process for each case. The raw data table in the following pages 
supplements the information provided in the case summaries.  
6.1.1 A Closer Look at Each Case 
Overpass in Varlik, 11/1/2006: Varlik is a working class neighborhood. A large road with very 
fast and busy traffic cuts the residential areas into two sections. Because authorities did not build 
the overpass after a road construction project, women in the neighborhood were very worried for 
their children crossing the road without an overpass or traffic light. As authorities did not 
respond to the demands of the residents, a closely-knit group of housewives walked to the road, 
and they also asked for the participation of acquaintances during their walk. This well-connected 
women’s friendship network then became larger with the mobilization of their acquaintances on 
their way Elite Network. The group made a human chain and blocked the road for about an hour. 
The next day the construction of overpass started. 
 
Street Names in Bahceli , 7/17/2007: Bahceli is one of the oldest middle-class neighborhoods in 
Ankara and it is known to support electorally more secular parties, but not the ruling AKP, party, 
as well as the mayor’s party. The street names were changed over night without any in put from 
the residents. The changes caused lot of chaos and problems with mail services. A muhtar72 
mobilized the neighborhood by making calls in the streets via a megaphone-installed car 
72 Muhtar is the elected head of a neighborhood. His/her responsibilities are mostly 
limited to operational tasks such as keeping track of residents ID information and organizing the 
ballot boxes during elections.   
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provided by a secular political party, CHP. No clear pre-existing network structure is present. 
The dominant form of the network is a isolated clique. The attempt to bring back the old street 
names failed. 
 
Street Lights in Oguzlar and Atakent, 7/14/2007: In Oguzlar and Atakent residents took to the 
streets to protest the non-working streetlights, a major security concern at nights. Oguzlar and 
Atakent mostly consist of massive suburban apartment complexes built for low and middle 
income Ankarians in the early1990s. Each apartment complex has a manager, and each 
apartment building in the complexes also has managers. Consequently, there is a hierarchical   
information network, despite a lack of strong ties.  
 
Amusement Park in Cayyolu, 12/17/2009:  Cayyolu is a middle, upper-middle class suburban 
neighborhood in the west side of Ankara. Over the years it became populated  mostly by secular 
and pro-CHP residents. Similar to Oguzlar and Atakent, Cayyolu typically consists of apartment 
complexes that generate a hierarchical information network. In 2009 the Greater Municipality of 
Ankara decided to build an amusement park on an unused but very central area in the 
neighborhood. Residents of Cayyolu instead demanded the construction of a town square. 
Especially people living in apartment buildings around the area opposed to the amusement park. 
Large numbers of residents participated in the protests. The amusement park plan eventually got 
cancelled. 
 
Cellular Tower in Doga Sitesi , 2/2009: The cellular tower in Doga Sitesi an apartment 
complex in Cayyolu was the first tower type cell site that was removed as a result of community 
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mobilization in Turkey. Organized by a local NGO dedicated to the minimization of 
electromagnetic fields, CEKOD, the multiple protests were also supplemented with a legal case. 
Similar to the amusement park case, residents of Doga Sitesi were more intensely involved with 
the case due to their perception of high levels of health risks.  The cell tower was removed by 
court decision, and the expert witness’ report mentions that the decision was justified by the 
neighborhood protests as a representation of the will of the community members. 
 
Inter-city Bust Stop in Cayyolu, 11/2009: Buses are still the most commonly used modes of 
transportation for traveling between cities in Turkey. Situated in the South West to the entrance 
of Ankara, Cayyolu residents could easily get off at a bus stop by Cayyolu instead of going to the 
inter-city bus station in the city center and going back to Cayyolu. In early 2009 Greater 
Municipality of Ankara decided to cancel the bus stop. This decision was met with uproar by the 
Cayyolu community since now they had to go all the way into the central city bus station and 
were forced to take a taxi ride back home. Cayyolu Platformu, a community organization tried to 
mobilize the community for protests each Sunday. But participation steadily declined and the 
protests’ waned shortly. Unlike cellular tower and amusement park cases, there were no groups 
that were more prone to physical harm or health risks. 
 
Cell Tower in Ziraat, 10/26/2010: Ziraat Neighborhood is located within the old town of 
Ankara. It is a  mixture of residential buildings, small shops located under these buildings, and 
public buildings. Despite being an old neighborhood, there is high mobility reflected by the high 
rates number of residents as renters. The mobilization towards the cell tower was organized 
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mostly by the network of small shopkeepers, an example of an elite network with weak ties. 
Protests did not lead to any change.  
 
Cell Tower In Aziziye , 5/12/2007: Aziziye in Cankaya is a relatively old, pro-CHP, and 
middle-upper middle class neighborhood. As a result of increasing migration to suburbs and 
gated communities within the city, most residents of the neighborhood are renters, and there are 
no formal or informal networks that connect the residents. A cell tower construction in the 
neighborhood was discovered by a group of residents in May of 2007. Due to the shortage of 
pre-existing mobilization networks; spontaneous mobilization was not able to bring together 
large numbers of people. The tower construction was stopped by the intervention of the mayor of 
Cankaya, through the network of some of residents with the mayor’s office. 
 
Cell Tower in Ovecler,  8/17/2007: Ovecler is a recently developing neighborhood in Dikmen, 
Cankaya. Residents are mostly from middle and lower middle classes. There is mixed 
development in the sense that residential buildings are juxtaposed with office spaces and small 
shops, as well as larger grocery stores and gas stations. There was a group of random bystanders 
when GSM company representatives were building a cell site in a residential building. Despite 
the confrontation with the police, the cell site was successfully built. 
 
Cell Tower in Eryaman,  5/25/2008: Eryaman is a working class suburban town at the West 
side of the city center. Its development was initiated by Housing Development Administration of 
Turkey (TOKI) as an affordable housing project in the 1990s. Their inhabitants consist of low-
middle income families, single professionals, and college students. Eryaman consists of etaps, 
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multiple tall housing blocs. Each housing block contains about 60 apartments. Due to high 
numbers of renters, and high mobility of students, neighborhood relations mostly consist of weak 
ties. While the spatial setting enables an information network similar to Cayyolu and Oguzlar, 
this mobilization was mostly mobilized by a movement entrepreneur individual by sticking up 
notices in the neighborhood, and communicating through his online and offline networks. As a 
result of multiple protests and a legal case, the disputed tower was removed, only to be replaced 
with another one, a hundred meters away. 
 
Cell Site in Ilkyerlesim, 12/2010: Ilk Yerlesim is a neighborhood in Batikent, another working 
class suburban town. The site of the incident is a townhouse complex. After one of the owners of 
the townhouses decided to rent his house for a GSM company, other residents spontaneously 
gathered for the protest.  The mobilization network in this case also resembles Isolated Cliques. 
Multiple protests over the month of December 2010 failed to bring any change. 
 
Nato Yolu, Multiple Cell Towers, 12/2008: Nato Yolu is a neighborhood in Mamak, one of the 
oldest shantytown areas in city. Nato Yolu is actually the name of a very long and wide street on 
which there are multiple grade schools. The mobilizations towards the cell towers around the 
schools were organized by the mothers of students in the schools. A few entrepreneurial mothers, 
who were also members of women’s rights NGO organized multiple protests that focused on 
stopping the traffic. Additional participants from each school supplemented the dense network 
among the entrepreneurial mothers core network. The mobilization network in this case 
resembles an Elite Network. None of the cell towers were removed as a result of these protests. 
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Cell Tower in Ege, 11/29/2011: Ege is also a neighborhood in Mamak. In this incident, 
company representatives and police arrived at a neighborhood park to build a cell tower during 
daytime. Participants were mobilized through the loudspeakers in a close by mosque by the help 
of Halk Evleri. The mobilization network can be characterized as isolated cliques. Cell tower 
was built despite the protest of small number of residents living around the park. 
 
Cell Tower in General Zeki Dogan, 4/8/2009 General Zeki Dogan GZD is another 
neighborhood in Mamak. The key figure in GZD is the muhtar, who has been working very hard 
to develop social networks and promote participation in local politics in the neighborhood. As an 
active member of women’s movement, GZD’s muhtar has been influential in fostering strong 
solidaristic ties among the women of GZD especially with her efforts to fight against domestic 
violence and to provide shelter for victims of domestic violence. The muhtar of GZD also 
generated an unusual information network by having a street representative for each street. 
Moreover, she encouraged civic participation by organizing demonstrations on different issue 
areas. The pre-existing network structure resembles a village network characterized by dense, 
and strong ties in the neighborhood. In this particular instance these networks were 
spontaneously mobilized and were able to stop the GSM company workers from building a cell 
tower despite the presence of police.  
 
Cell Cite in Kutlu Neighborhood, September 2011: Kutlu is also a neighborhood in Mamak. 
This case is also an example of spontaneous mobilization, and the mobilization network 
resembles a village type, based on strong ties developed over the years of attending the same 
mosque for Friday prayers. The incident happened just after a Friday prayer service and 
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attendants of the prayer service confronted the police and company representatives and were able 
to prevent them from building the cell site. 
 
Cell Cite in Tuzlucayir, 12/2009: Tuzlucayir is another neighborhood in Mamak. This was also 
a successful and spontaneous mobilizations towards a cell site that was planned to be built within 
an apartment building. The main sources of mobilization in this case were the patrons of a coffee 
shop and close by residents. The interesting point about this mobilization is how participants 
developed a phone chain to alert each other in case the company representatives came back. The 
mobilization structure is similar to a village type of network. 
 
Cell Cite in Sahintepe, 5/11/11: Sahintepe is also a neighborhood in Mamak. But unlike other 
mentioned neighborhoods, it still mostly remains as a gecekondu area. Consequently, due to lack 
of urban regeneration, immigrants who first moved there about 30 years ago still live there. This 
long-term residency obviously signals the fact that people have very strong ties. This incident 
happened while women of the neighborhood were working together for winter preparation. Once 
they realized who the company representatives were, they physically confronted both with the 
police and the company workers, and did not let them build the cell cite. The mobilization 
network in this case also looks like a village type of network. 
6.1.2 Geographical Distribution of Cases 
As displayed in Figure 27, twelve of the cases are concentrated in the towns of Mamak and 
Cayyolu area while the remaining five are scattered mostly around the city center. Therefore, this 
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section will focus on the to the dynamics of civic participation and protests particularly at 
Mamak and Cayyolu. 
Mamak and Cayyolu display very different socio-demographic characteristics, but it is 
possible to claim that these two towns have the highest levels of activism in Ankara not only 
based on the high frequency of protest events, but also due high number of neighborhood 
associations in comparison to other towns as displayed in Table XX. 
 
Figure 27 The Geographical Distribution of Cases  
 
 
Source: Google Maps 
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Cayyolu is a middle-upper class suburban neighborhood that started to develop in late 
1980s in the South-West of Ankara (Karagol, 2007).  The current population of Cayyolu is about 
125.000 (Cankaya Municipality, 2013). Most of the land in this area was farming land with small 
populations. The majority of the initial housing projects in the area were initiated by the Turkish 
Army Members Solidarity Fund (OYAK), for the members of the Turkish military. Moreover, in 
early 1990s, and late 1980s, the urban middle-upper middle class in Ankara still consisted of 
secular, Kemalist, and bureaucratic and military elite, since the rise of the Islamist urban middle 
classes was still in the making (White, 2011; Narli, 1999)73. Consequently, over time this secular 
middle class socio-economic structure, and its anti-AKP stance became one of the defining 
characteristics of the residents of Cayyolu in Ankara.  
Many of my respondents have raised this defining nature of Cayyolu community during 
my interviews in Cayyolu. With an implicit elitism, it was common for my respondents to start 
the interview with statements like,  
 
“You know, Cayyolu is a very different place… Cayyolu has a special demographic 
structure that is not found to be anywhere in Ankara…” or  “Melih Gokcek74 hates Cayyolu, he 
knows he will never get enough votes from here, that’s why he keeps messing with us.”  
 
On November 7, 2013, Turkish Parliament passed a new legislation that re-categorized 
Cayyolu district to be within the borders of Cankaya municipality75, another district that 
73 See  Yavuz (2009) for further discussion on the transformation of the middle class in 
Turkey starting early 1990s.  
74 Elected mayor of Ankara 
75 http://www.cayyolu.com.tr/haber/FLAS-Cayyolu-Cankaya-ilcesine-baglandi/69818 
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consistently elects mayors that are members of CHP. For many CHP supporters, this act is a 
perfect example of gerrymandering (Demir, 2013), since one of the major reasons for CHP’s 
victory in Yenimahalle, the previous district that Cayyolu was a part of, was due to votes coming 
from Cayyolu. In the absence of Cayyolu votes, Yenimahalle is likely to be won by AKP in 
upcoming municipal elections (Demir 2013).  
Located on the North-East of Ankara, Mamak is a low income, working class town 
populated by migrants from mostly other central Anatolian cities. Despite the recent 
transformation to apartment building types of housing, both as a result of state sponsored urban 
regeneration projects and through initiatives of the gecekondu76 owners77, Mamak is still known 
as a gecekondu dominated town (Karagol, 2007).  Most inhabitants of Mamak are migrants from 
peripheral rural districts of Ankara or from mid-Anatolian cities including Yozgat, Kirikkale, 
Kirsehir, Corum, Sivas, Kayseri, and Cankiri (Coskun, 2003).  
Mamak is also known to be a spatial center of mobilization of left-wing groups in the 
1960s and 1970s. Many left-wing groups carried out their organizing activities in the gecekondu 
neighborhoods of Mamak in these years, and these neighborhoods were known as “Liberated 
Areas (Kurtarılmış Bölgeler)” since police forces would have a hard time even physically 
getting inside (Coskun 2003, pg. 4. ) 
 
 
76 Type of housing built by the immigrants in large cities on state land without 
permission. Gece means night, kondu means built, gecekondu literally meaning built overnight, 
in order to avoid government authorities. 
77 Many gecekondu owners starting 1980s worked with private contractors to turn their 
gecekondus into apartment buildings. Gecekondu owners transfer the ownership of their land to 
private contractors in return for a few apartments in the apartment buildings that are constricted 
by the contractors known as mutahits.  
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Table 18 The Comparison of Mamak and Cayyolu 
Source: TUIK 2013, and Hurriyet Emlak 
 
Despite the apparent socio-economic and demographic differences between Cayyolu and 
Mamak, one striking similarity is the high number of neighborhood organizations in both areas. 
Although not all cases in this study involve mobilizations with formal organizations, we can still 
consider the high numbers of local organizations as an indicator of a high level of civic 
participation in both Mamak and Cayyolu.78  
A closer look at these organizations reveal the fact that the nature of the dominant type of 
neighborhood organizations in Mamak and Cayyolu are fundamentally different. Most 
organizations in Cayyolu can be categorized in three groups: 1 social clubs for leisurely activities 
such as singing and sports e.g. Cayyolu Musiki Cemiyeti, Cayyolu Halk Muzigi Dernegi, and 
Bric ve Satranc Sevenler Dernegi; 2 Service oriented organizations, mostly services for the 
elderly and the disabled e.g. Cayyolu Yaslilara Saygi Dernegi, Omurilik Felclileri Dernegi; and 3 
78 The question of why we observe such relatively high levels civic participation in these two areas, but 
not in other neighborhoods or districts is not the major concern of this study. As will be discussed in the 
coming conclusion/future research section, this question of emergence in itself is a very important 
question that requires a separate study based on a different research design. 
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Advocacy and rights oriented organizations for women’s rights, consumer rights, animal rights, 
environmental organizations, and branches of more politicized organizations such as Ataturkce 
Dusunce Dernegi. 
Unlike Cayyolu, most neighborhood organizations in Mamak consist of village 
associations established by the migrant communities. The two main functions of these 
organizations are representing the interests of their members, and providing formal and informal 
support for migrants that lack the social support networks in Ankara. The formal function of 
these organizations is mostly compensating the costs of weddings and funerals for needy families 
by using the membership dues (Coskun, 2003). But more importantly, village associations play a 
crucial role by facilitating the social inclusion of migrants into the urban milieu through informal 
functions such as helping them to find a job, providing child support, and acting as 
intermediaries between local politicians and migrant communities (Keyder, 2005; and Coskun, 
2003).  
Consequently the nature of associational life in Cayyolu and Mamak are very different; 
while organizations in Cayyolu brings residents together based on shared interests, belief 
systems, and common recreational interests such as hobby clubs, the dominant form of local 
organizations in Mamak, village associations is mostly concerned with exclusive needs and 
interests of their members. This diversion is also reflected in the difference of formal ties among 
organizations in both settings; organizations in Cayyolu are successfully organized under the 
Cayyolu Platform79 whereas attempts of to form an effective platform in Mamak under The 
Mamak Mass Organizations Platform MMOP, Mamak Kitle Örgütleri Platformu practically 
failed (Coskun, 2003).  
79 http://www.cayyoluplatformu.com/ 
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Accordingly it is possible to argue that inter-organizational social networks in Cayyolu 
resemble bridging social capital in which associations are more open to larger community 
interests in Cayyolu rather than exclusive interests, which are characterized by crosscutting and 
vertical networks of trust, and also mostly consist of weak ties Putnam, 2000; Granovetter, 1982; 
and Anheier and Kendall, 2002. This structure is also reflected in the physical office space of 
neighborhood associations in Cayyolu; most of the organizational members of Cayyolu are 
located on a floor provided by the municipality, and many members have more than one 
membership. It is possible to claim that these networks look like bridging networks within the 
Cayyolu, and when we consider the possibility of integrating these networks with the larger 
inter-organizational networks in Ankara, and Turkey, they would be remarkably exclusive 
towards Islamist groups, religious and ethnic minorities in Turkey80.  
Contrarily, inter-organizational networks in Mamak appear to have high levels of 
bonding social capital (Putnam, 2000; Narayan, 1999; and Anheier and Kendall, 2002), in the 
sense that these migrant associations are exclusively concerned with the interests of their 
members. They lack weak ties with organizations that represent different interests, and are 
characterized by strong ties or what Anheier and Kendall, (2002) call as thick trust among their 
members. This is not very surprising since across different cultures it is common to observe that 
when individuals from more collectivist settings migrate to individualistic milieus, they tend to 
overemphasize their identity of origin, and depend heavily on the informal networks of migrant 
communities (Bashi, 2007). Such mechanisms can lead to the emergence of exclusive identities.  
80 This argument shows that setting the boundaries of a network may have a profound effect on 
whether the overall network is characterized by bonding or bridging ties. Consequently, analysis of only 
certain layers of a nested system Ostrom, 2007 is not complete without the consideration of the overall 
system and ties across different layers.  
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Overall whether bridging or bonding types of ties are defining the nature of civic 
participation does not matter much in the process of neighborhood protests, because the issues of 
contention are bounded by the interests of smaller communities as in the case of protests against 
cellular towers81. Especially when the low levels of civic participation in Turkey are considered, 
it neither likely nor surprising that these protests do not unite and turn into city-wide or nation 
wide movements. As will be discussed shortly, the types of ties matter in terms of shaping the 
size and tactics used in protest events.  
The remaining five settings lack the vibrant associational life as exemplified in Cayyolu 
and Mamak and this phenomenon deserves further examination.  
6.2 MAIN HYPOTHESES 
How and why should networks have an effect on the outcome of the collective action cases under 
study in this chapter? Apparently, the structure of the networks does not have a direct effect on 
the outcome; networks matter in indirect ways through various mechanisms. Based on a review 
of literature, I hypothesize that two distinct processes result in successful outcomes in the case 
neighborhood level protests. 
 The first process focuses on the tactics used during the protest events, more specifically 
the absence or presence of disruptive tactics. The evidence on whether disruptive strategies work 
or not remains mixed due to diverse approaches to measure collective action outcomes as well as 
81 It not surprising that most participants in protest events against cellular towers come from the 
same block, or residents of a small locale that feel threatened by the adverse health effects of cellular 
towers.  
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measurement related problems (Rojas, 2006; Giugni 1999). Overall, as Rojas (2006) argues 
social movements are likely to succeed when the costs of repressing the movement are larger 
than the costs of meeting the demands. In that regard Button’s (1978) study on Black riots in 
1960s in the US still provide the most nuanced description of the conditions under which 
disruptive tactics are more likely to succeed.  
 According to Button 1978 disruptive protests are likely to succeed when: 
1- The demands of the protagonist are possible to meet by the power holders;  
2 - Disruption is not threatening to spread and generate instability in the larger society;  
3 -Public and bystanders are sympathetic to the goals of the protestors;  
4 -Demands are clear, confined, tangible, and specific; and  
5- Disruptive tactics are used in combination with peaceful measures. 
 When we consider the nature and demands of the cases analyzed in this chapter, it is 
obvious that most cases almost perfectly meet the criteria stated by Button. For example, in 
protests against the cell towers: when both GSM companies and local authorities can condone 
the absence of a single cellular tower, such protests do not seem to be very strong all over the 
country Most people sympathize with the protestors since many individuals continue to believe 
in the adverse health effects of cell sites, and goals of the challengers are notably limited and 
clear; they simply ask for the removal of a cellular tower. Therefore the first main hypotheses of 
this chapter as follows: 
 
Hypothesis I:  Disruptive tactics are more likely to succeed. 
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  The second causal condition that is likely to be associated with successful outcomes is 
participation of large number of participants based on the rationale previously identified in 
Chapter IV. When disruptive tactics are utilized by a large number of protestors antagonists may 
be concerned about larger instabilities, therefore, I hypothesize that disruptive tactics and large 
number of participants in protest events are mutually exclusive causal conditions that are both 
likely to be associated with successful outcomes. Thus the second main hypothesis of this 
analysis is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis II: Protests with a large number of participants are more likely to succeed. 
6.2.1 Network Related Hypotheses 
 
The nature of the mobilization networks in the protest events being studied have an indirect 
influence on the outcomes by having an effect on the previously stated major hypotheses.  As 
discussed in detail in the second chapter of this dissertation, one crucial function of network 
structure is affiliating/hindering coordination activities by having an effect on the flow of 
information. Consequently, if the network structure enables the fast flow of information among 
large number of people, more people are likely to participate in the protest events. Consequently 
the hypothesis is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis III: The network structure will be associated with the size of protest events. 
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It is not possible to hypothesize exactly which types of structure can facilitate the most efficient 
and effective flow of information due to lack of reliable evidence in the current literature. 
Secondly, high levels of bonding social capital or strong ties among the participants are more 
likely to be involved in risk confrontation with the police and getting into custody.   
Consequently the final hypothesis in this chapter is: 
 
Hypothesis IV:  Presence of strong ties among the community is associated with utilization of 
disruptive tactics during protest events.  
 
Figure 28 summarizes the causal model to be tested in in this chapter. Women in the picture not 
only migrated to Ankara from the same village, but also have been living in the same gecekondu 
neighborhood for more than thirty years, and resemble a perfect example of a network 
characterized with strong ties.  
 
Figure 28 Causal Model 
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6.2.2 Operationalizations of the Outcome and Causal Conditions 
The analysis in this chapter is based on QCA similar to Chapter IV. Causal conditions are also 
similar to the ones identified in Chapter IV order to consider all possible explanations of 
collective action outcomes in the literature. However the operationalization of these conditions is 
quite different since the cases under study have different characteristics as discussed in the 
beginning of this chapter. Following are the explanation of the operationalizations: 
 
Outcome (O): Outcome condition displays whether the protest event/s led to successful outcomes 
or not. 
History (H): Neighborhoods with previous experience of activism are more likely to be 
motivated to be involved in non-institutional forms of collective actions, such as protest events. 
Expected direction of relationship: positive 
SMO (SMO): SMOs provide many material and non-material resources for collective action 
events. Consequently, events in which SMOs are present are expected to be more likely to be 
successful in comparison to events without SMO involvement.    
STOP (STOP): This causal condition shows whether the protest event is aiming at halting an 
action, and trying to reverse an already present condition. Expected direction of relationship: 
positive since as previously mentioned, it is easier to stop an action in comparison to reversal 
Life (L): Based on framing theories, this condition evaluates whether participants of the protest 
events perceive the problem as life threatening as in the case in cellular tower cases or as in the 
case of overpass case. If the protagonists of the event perceive a life threatening risk, they are 
assumed to be more motivated to pursue the goals of the protest event. Expected direction of 
relationship: positive 
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Elite (E): Based on theories of opportunity structure, this causal condition reflects whether the 
challengers have allies with elites.  More specifically, this condition is coded based on the 
absence or presence of elected local politicians, and/or members of the parliament at protest 
events. Expected direction of relationship: positive. 
Population (P): Population condition is simply based on the number of estimated participants at 
the protest events according to the police records. This causal condition has multiple values 
0=low number of participants,1=medium number of participants,2=high number of participants. 
The assignment of cases for each category is based on Figure 29.  
 
 
Figure 29 Calibration of Population Condition 
 
 
 156 
As the Figure 29 displays, cases with smaller than 70 participants are coded as 0, between 
70 and 500 are coded as 1, and larger than 500 re-coded as 2. The decision to do so is based on 
the sudden changes in the slope as signified by the blue vertical lines.  
Disruptive (D): This condition shows absence or presence of disruptive tactics such as physical 
confrontation with the police. 
Strong (SR): SR displays the presence or absence of strong ties among protest participants. 
According to Krackhardt (1992), strong ties have three main characteristics: (1) relatively long 
history of interaction, (2) affection, liking among dyads, and (3) high frequency of interaction. 
Cases with all three characteristics are coded as 2, cases with two characteristics are coded as 1, 
and cases with only one or none of characteristics are coded as 0.  
Network (NW):  This multi-value condition signifies 4 main types of mobilization networks: 
isolated cliques (0), village (1), elite (2), and hierarchy (3). There are no cases that fit to be 
operationalized as Small World Network.  
Table 19 is the data table, and provides details of conditions and cases before the data are 
transformed into a truth table82.   Next, Table 20 is the truth table that summarizes the cases. 
Each row of the truth table shows an empirically observed combination of causal conditions and 
outcomes for the Model I, the first stage of the causal model introduced previously (Ragin, 
2008). According to the truth table, there are seven collective action cases with successful 
outcomes. Overall four configurations cover these seven cases.    
 
 
 
82 All analysis is carried out in R environment using the QCA package written by Dusa and Miller 
2013. 
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Table 19 Raw Data Table 
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Table 20 Truth Table Model-I 
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 Logical remainders, logically possible configurations that are not observed empirically 
(Rihoux and De Meur, 2009) are not displayed in the truth table. There are no contradictions in 
the truth table, in the sense that no similar configurations lead to different outcomes. The 
configuration that covers most cases is represented as the fifth configuration, covering cases 
from GZD, Kutlu, Tuzlu, Sirin. Folliwing.  The configuration with next highest coverage is 
displayed in the first row, and covers three cases; Ovecler, Ziraat, and Batikent.  
6.3 DATA ANALYSIS 
Similar to Chapter IV, the main analysis technique is Multi-Value Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (mvQCA). 
6.3.1 Boolean Minimization Results for Model I 
The intermediate solution for the first model led to three configurations. Table 21 displays the 
results from the first model. 
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Table 21 Minimization Results for Model I 
 
 
In accordance with the Hypothesis II, the first configuration solely consists of presence of 
high number of participants. The second configuration on the other hand, combines presence of 
elite allies with the presence of perception of life/health risks in relation to the issue being 
contested. This finding is also consistent with the literature and displays that elites of the 
protagonists may tend to insert more pressure on decision makers if the issue is framed as urgent 
and life threatening.  
The final configuration also confirms Hypothesis I to a great extent by combining 
presence of disruptive tactics, presence of perception of the issue as life threatening and absence 
of formal SMOs. This finding is not surprising; as previously discussed disruptive tactics are 
more likely to be successful if there is strong sympathy and support from the general public. 
Lack of presence of formal organizations and framing of the issue as a matter of health are both 
conditions that would inflate public sympathy for the contesters, especially in Turkey. The 
reason for that is the presence of general distrust towards SMOs, particularly the politically 
oriented ones. Even the Turkish word that denotes that a person is a member of a SMO, orgutlu, 
is used in a pejorative way by both policy makers and majority of the public.83 
83 For example, during the clashes between the police forces and citizens on May Day in Istanbul 
labor day, 5/1/2003, a young girl , Dilan is severely injured by the police and the at the time of writing 
this chapter she is still in intensive care. The mayor of Istanbul defended the action of the police by 
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The remaining analysis section investigates whether the second phase of the causal model 
is also plausible. Causal conditions that may be associated with the second configuration are not 
examined any further because having elite allies is most likely to be explained with class related 
characteristics of the neighborhood and not with network structure related conditions.  
 The next truth table displays all the empirically observed configurations when the 
outcome is a high number of participants.  
 
 
 
Table 22 Truth Table Model II=Outcome Participation 
 
 
 
claiming that Dilan was “orgutlu”. http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25439663/ Soon it was clear that the 
Dilan was not a member of any legal/illegal organizations and suddenly the public support increased 
dramatically. http://www.aksam.com.tr/guncel/dilanin-avukatlarindan-aciklama/haber-202517 
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There are overall 14 configurations. Only five of these configurations had a high number 
of participants in the protest events while the remaining nine configurations have negative 
outcomes.  
The truth table shows that cases #3 and 4, and cases #5 and 11, and cases #16 and 17 
have the same configurations of 0s and 1s. The rest of the cases have unique configurations. 
 
Table 23 Minimization Results- Model II 
 
 
Minimal formulas produced by intermediate solution reveal two different causal paths to 
mobilizing high number of participants for a protest event. For both paths, presence of pre-
planned protest activity is required SPO {0}. The first path combines planning activity with 
presence of hierarchical network structure to disseminate information about the protest events. 
As previously discussed, hierarchical social networks are criticized for not being robust enough, 
and also for lacking the structural properties for feedback loops.  
This finding suggests that these types of networks may be valuable if the main purpose it 
to simply disseminate information for a future event, This finding also suggests that the long 
criticized suburban housing complex projects that squeeze large numbers of people into tall 
apartment buildings may actually create some unexpected opportunities for effective organizing 
by enabling the formation of hierarchical information dissemination networks across large 
populations that are not available in the  more traditional urban apartment housing style 
dominant in Turkey.  
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One problem with this argument is the absence of small-world network type of structures 
among the cases under study; therefore it is hard to tell how hierarchical structures would 
perform in comparison to small world network types of structures.84  
 The second path combines absence of spontaneous protest with the presence of history of 
previous mobilization in the neighborhood, and organizational efforts by SMOs. This finding is 
not surprising since if individuals have previous experience of participation in protest events, 
they are more likely to participate again, and when organizing efforts are facilitated by the 
resources of a formal SMO without a time pressure, more people are likely to turn out in protest 
events.  
  
Table 24 Truth Table for Model III-Outcome= Disruptive 
 
 
84 Future research can address this issue using simulation analysis. 
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 Findings of the final leg of the causal model are presented in the coming tables. This final 
analysis examines the relationship between network structure and tendency for disruptive tactics 
 
Table 25 Minimization Results for Model III 
 
 
The final truth table displays 15 configurations when outcome is absence or presence of 
disruptive tactics. Among those, only five configurations have positive outcomes for presence of 
disruptive events. The truth table used in the minimization process shows that cases #5 and 11, 
and cases #16 and 17, have the same configurations of 0s and 1s. The rest of the cases have 
unique configurations.  
Similar to previous analysis, the intermediate solution is used as the final finding of the 
Boolean reduction. The two paths identified as a result are rather interesting: Perception of a life-
threatening problem by the contesters is the first requirement in both paths. This comes as a 
natural finding since confronting the police forces physically is really a risky action, especially in 
Turkey85, and it is expected that groups perceiving a life-threatening issue may be more likely to 
take such risks. As expected, strength of ties does matter in explaining the process in relation to 
disruptive tactics.  
85 http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/libertycentral/2011/dec/11/turkey-progressive-
repression 
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In the first causal path, we see that strong ties in combination with the presence of 
spontaneous protest events and life-threatening perception is associated with successful 
outcomes. This is an interesting finding and suggests that when spontaneity is combined with 
higher risks, only strong ties can mobilize people. Overall, the first path suggests that trust is an 
important factor in mobilizing people for risky action, especially under time constraints.  
The second path shows that medium strength ties can still mobilize people for high-risk 
protests; if possible participants have previous experience of protest participation. Previous 
research also confirms that participation in social movement activity is more likely for 
individuals that have participation history in the past (Diani and McAdam, 2003). 
 The presence or lack of elite allies also suggests that individuals are more likely to 
participate in high risk protest activity when they know that they are alone, in the sense that they 
lack clientelistic networks with decision makers that could have been utilized instead of 
participating in protest events with high risks.  
6.4 SUMMARY 
Chapter VI aimed at understanding the role of pre-exiting interpersonal networks in shaping 
neighborhood level protest outcomes. The first section focused on the issue of spontaneity, and 
the interaction between space and formation of social ties that turn into mobilization ties in many 
cases.  
Next, Chapter VI concentrated on two neighborhoods with the highest level of civic 
participation as reflected in the high number of protest events and neighborhood level civic 
 167 
organizations. A closer look at these two neighborhoods revealed that the nature of social capital 
was quite different from each other.  
The roots of activism and types of ties in Cayyolu resemble bridging type of social 
capital, networks of trust and tolerance among groups that do not necessarily represent similar 
ethnic religious groups. However, the whole neighborhood in Cayyolu is in a way united around 
the secular statist ideology represented by the CHP. The nature and borders of civic participation 
in Mamak on the contrary resemble bonding social capital since civic participation in Mamak is 
mostly determined by immigrant communities and their organizations that exclusively work to 
seek benefits for their members and these organizations have few strong ties that connect them 
with each other.  
Next section of Chapter VI carried out a two-layered QCA analysis, similar to the one in 
Chapter IV. This section identified disruptive techniques and widespread participation as the two 
crucial causal conditions that tend to be shaped by the structure and/or nature of pre-existing 
interpersonal networks in the neighborhoods. The mvQCA analysis showed that the presence of 
strong ties among a small number of residents was  important in order for protestors to utilize 
disruptive techniques.  
In order to facilitate the mobilization of a large number of protestors at the neighborhood 
level, further analysis suggests that hierarchical information networks are crucial if the possible 
participants have low thresholds for participation, and high levels of motivation and commitment 
as is the case in most cellular tower related cases. The main channel of these hierarchical 
networks has been the spatial plans and the nature of apartment complexes in most 
neighborhoods.  
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Overall, this chapter highlighted the vitality of the pre-existing networks that can be 
present in many shapes and forms. Community organizers need to consider innovative ways to 
activate these possible networks that may stem from spatial arrangements, or simply be there as a 
result of strong friendship  among women in the neighborhood.  
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7.0  CONCLUSION 
7.1 BEYOND SIMPLE ANSWERS 
This study did not aim at providing a simplistic answer to the intricate problem of 
understanding when and how social networks matter in explaining collective action outcomes. 
As Giugni (1999) highlights, collective action outcomes are the results of various complex 
mechanisms: 
 
“Looking for general causes and invariant models is doomed to failure, for there 
are no such invariant patterns in social life. In fact, this may be all the more true when 
we are dealing with the consequences of social movements, as we are confronted with 
variation in the characteristics of movements, in the contexts in which they operate, and 
in the outcomes of their activities. Instead of searching for general explanations, we 
would do a better job by taking into account the historically contingent combinations of 
factors that shape the possibilities for movements to contribute to social change.” (pg. 
XXV) 
 
To make things even more complicated, social network researchers have also argued that 
there is no single magic bullet network structure that outperforms the others when it comes to 
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explaining collective action outcomes (e.g. Gould, 1993; and Siegel, 2009). These scholars 
showed how different network structures strongly interact with the causal conditions derived 
from the specific context of each collective action case. In that sense, it is not surprising that the 
findings of this study show that different network structures are conducive to successful 
outcomes in combination with different causal factors in different contexts. 
Charles Tilly (1999) once described the strength of a movement by the following formula 
(pg. 260): 
 
“Strength= worthiness X unity X numbers X commitment” 
 
 Tilly (1999) argued that low values in one component could be compensated by high 
values in another one, but a value of zero for any of the factors would mean zero strength for the 
movement. My analyses also confirmed that all the factors Tilly mentioned were crucial in 
facilitating successful collective action events. Further analyses of these factors in relation to 
networks showed that specifically the last two factors, numbers and commitment, tend to be 
affiliated with different types of alliance or mobilization structures.  
Consequently, my findings suggest that organizers need to first evaluate the specific 
context of each collective action case and devise network design strategies accordingly.  
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7.2 SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS 
The main research question that guided this study asked when, how and which type of network 
structure mattered in shaping collective action outcomes. The secondary research question, as 
investigated in Chapter V, considered the processes of tie formation and strength. 
The first analytical chapter, Chapter IV focused on the role of alliance networks in 
enabling successful movement outcomes based on urban movement cases from Ankara, Turkey 
between 2006 and 2011. The findings of this chapter illustrate that political opportunity related 
factors such as presence or absence of elite alliance, relative openness or closeness of the system 
operationalized based on whether the antagonist is a public agency.  
This finding underlines the limited power of social movements in semi-democratic 
settings. In other words, when the larger institutional system is relatively closed  in response  to  
demands of citizens with the exception of electoral cycles, movement based strategies rarely 
make a difference. However, the QCA analysis showed that network structure mattered to a 
certain extent in mobilizing large numbers of organizations and moving the debate from local to 
national levels, two causal factors that are shown to be important for positive outcomes when the 
political opportunity structure is favorable.  
Chapter V demonstrated that homophily and assortativity related mechanisms were at work 
in the process of tie formation and in understanding variation in tie strength. Based on the 
knowledge gained during the fieldwork and relevant literature, this chapter closed with an 
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emphasis on the further data needs to consider the reciprocity and path dependency mechanisms 
for explaining tie formation and tie strength among the SMOs in Turkey. 86 
The last analytical chapter, Chapter VI, focused on interpersonal mobilization networks at 
the neighborhood level protest events. Most of these cases were mobilizations towards cell 
towers in close proximity to residential areas. The analysis in this chapter showed that strong ties 
such as long-term friendship ties among immigrant women in squatter neighborhoods were 
instrumental for the presence of high levels of commitment as reflected in willingness to 
participate in high-risk protest events involving disruptive techniques.  
This chapter also stressed the interaction between space and the formation of collective 
action. The analysis of pre-existing networks that were activated during the protest events 
indicated that particular spatial setting of a neighborhood could facilitate or hinder successful 
collective action by influencing the dissemination of protest- related  information that strongly 
determines the size of a protest event.   
7.3 SOME POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
There are a few policy lessons to consider based on the findings of the study for the 
organizers of non-institutional forms of collective action: 
 
 
 
86 Directed network data would be necessary for the study of reciprocity and panel data 
would be required to formally analyze the path dependent nature of tie strength.  
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• In semi-democratic, increasingly authoritarian contexts such as Turkey, collective action 
organizers need to primarily focus on the external dynamics in the political structure and 
look for opportunities to form alliances with elites. When the political environment is 
favorable, organizers can look for ways to form ties across cohesive SMO communities 
or expand their network by encouraging tie formation   
 
• Community organizers, social movement activists, and national and international donors 
for civil society organizations in developing countries should consider the role of 
networks in shaping policy outcomes of social movements. Therefore, organizations 
should not be considered in isolation, instead the networks can be evaluated at the main 
unit, especially with regard to funding purposes.  
 
• Forming weak ties among well-connected groups of actors is likely to increase material 
and non-material resources available for the movement organizers, as well as to boost the 
resilience of the movement 
 
• Community organizers need to pay special attention to the spatial arrangements of the 
neighborhoods in which they work, since spatiality strongly interacts with the formation 
of social networks in the neighborhoods that can be activated during a protest event. 
 
• Similarly, pre-existing social networks that tend to exist in places of worship, coffee 
houses, and strong friendship networks among homemaker women in traditional 
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neighborhoods can be considered for triggering collective action, instead of trying to 
build networks around the issue that constitutes the main concern of the protest events. 
7.4 CONSIDERING SOME OF THE LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
7.4.1 Limitations due to the data 
The data used in chapters five and six are based on newspaper  reports. As previously 
mentioned, the network matrices derived from the newspaper accounts may not be sufficiently 
comprehensive, as they do not cover all social movement related events, and also do not report  
more peripheral, smaller, and lesser known organizations that are involved in the event. These 
are concerns regarding the internal validity, more specifically, the content validity of the data. 
While acknowledging the presence of some content validity problems, this study assumes that 
the reporting error/bias is more or less similar across cases.   
Similarly, the police records that are used to identify social movement/collective action 
events may not be comprehensive enough, especially since the records do not cover events in 
townships on the outskirts of Ankara. 
 In addition to these limitations, the main unit of analysis used in Chapter IV and V is 
organizations. However, individuals with no organizational membership may be present at the 
social movement. As Oliver (1989) suggests “Whole social movements are complex 
phenomena encompassing organizations, informal groups, crowds, consciousness, and the 
interactions among all these elements. It is a mistake to equate a movement with the 
organizations pursuing its goals (pg. 18).  
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For example, during the recent uprising in June 2013 in Turkey that started as a protest to 
save the last green space in central Istanbul and soon spread to the major cities, many 
participants were not affiliated with any organization87. One of the exploratory studies on 
profiling the protestors revealed that 79% of the participating protestors were not affiliated with 
any civic or political organization KONDA, 2013.  
Unfortunately, none of the cases analyzed in this study was able to gather popular support 
as in the recent Gezi88 movement. Except the mobilization for stopping the killing of street 
animals and for improving animal rights, none of studied cases was able to steadily mobilize 
more than 100-200 people at a time. Therefore, the effect of ignoring the role of individuals 
with no organizational membership is assumed to be minimal.  
7.4.2 Limitations of the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) 
Most QCA researchers claim that one of the strengths of QCA is that it falls midway between 
large-n quantitative research and case studies by providing depth about cases while allowing for 
some level of generalization (e.g. Kim and Lee, 2008).  Yet, QCA neither provides in-depth 
analyses and thick descriptions of cases as in case study approach, nor has generalizability as 
large-n quantitative studies. Moreover, it is a technique based on deterministic causality that 
does not recognize stochastic processes. 
87 For a review of the major findings of the study in English see 
http://www.bianet.org/english/youth/147543-94-percent-of-gezi-resisters-participate-
individually-poll-says 
88 Gezi is the name of the park that was planned to be demolished to be replaced by a 
mall that resembled an old military barracks from the Ottoman Era.  
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 Despite these limitations, it is the best available technique for analysis of data that consist 
of fourteen or seventeen cases. As Provan et al. (2007) stated, one of the challenges of 
conducting cross-network studies is identifying comparable cases and collecting network data 
for multiple networks. In that regard, the current study still makes an important contribution to 
cross network studies.  
7.4.3 Limitations Due to the Conceptualization of the Antagonist 
Another limitation of the study is the monolithic conceptualization of the antagonists. Every case 
analyzed, presents a primary organization that is challenged by the participants. Yet, these 
primary organizations are also embedded within complex networks of interests. By considering 
the interactions among the antagonists as well as the ones between the antagonists and the 
challengers, it would be possible to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the 
relationship between network structure and non-institutional forms of collective action.   
Future research can incorporate the network of antagonists by utilizing the Strategic 
Action Fields (SAF) framework outlined by Fligstein and McAdam (2011).  Fligstein and 
McAdam’s theory of SAF aims at explaining social change based on a view of society governed 
by a “a complex web of strategic action fields” (pg.3). SAFs are dynamic meso-level fields of 
struggle between networks of challengers and incumbents and Fligstein and McAdam consider 
“fields as embedded in complex webs of other fields" (pg.8).  
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7.5 FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
7.5.1 Emergence of Collective Action 
Having examined the collective action outcomes, I intend to turn to processes of 
emergence to develop a more holistic understanding of the relationship between social networks 
and collective action. Specifically, I would like to investigate why in some neighborhoods in 
Turkey we observe high levels of activism towards cell towers, whereas such activism is absent 
in other neighborhoods with similar socio-demographic characteristics.  
 Most studies on the emergence of collective action revolve around 
strain/breakdown related explanations (e.g. Tilly, 1975; Goldstone and Tilly, 2001; and 
Buechler, 2004). In a more recent study, Snow et al. (2010) argue that the disruptions and threats 
to the quotidian, the routines and expectation of daily life, are significant to understand 
emergence of social movements.  
 I would like to combine strain/breakdown theories with network approaches and 
explore the mechanisms through which pre-existing social networks are triggered and 
transformed into networks of activism. 
7.5.2 Online and Offline Activism 
Finally, I would like to focus more on the relationship between online and offline 
activism. None of the cases included in the study effectively utilized online networks for 
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mobilization, except the case on animal rights.89 Yet, most organizing efforts during the recent 
Gezi protests were organized online. Even the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan 
acknowledged the power of social media in facilitating the communication and coordination of 
tens of thousands of protestors: “There is now a scourge that is called Twitter. The best examples 
of lies can be found there. To me, social media is the worst menace to society.”90 
Consequently, any work on non-institutional forms of collective action in Turkey cannot 
ignore the role of online networks anymore. As Table 26 displays, the number of Internet 
subscribers in Turkey has increased exponentially since 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
89 Yet, organizing online is not considered as a causal factor in the analysis section of 
Chapter IV. This is due to the fact causal conditions with not enough diversity can not be 
included in QCA. Animal rights oriented case is also the only one that represents the grievances 
of middle-upper middle class citizens in Ankara. Due to same reason, social class is not 
considered as a causal condition in the analysis. 
90 http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2013/06/03/turkey_recep-tayyip-erdogan-twitter-
social-media_n_3377233.html 
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Table 26 Internet Subscribers in Turkey 1998-2013 
 
 
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute Website 
 
In addition to these technical necessities, there is so much to be uncovered about the 
complex relationship between presence in social media and street level activism since current 
research shows that neither technology skeptics nor social media optimists can fully explain the 
intricacies of the interaction between virtual and offline networks.   
 
 180 
During the recent Gezi uprisings, social media were  used extensively for various reasons 
by the protestors. For example, an exploratory analysis of Gezi-related tweets by the NYU's 
Social Media and Political Participation laboratory91 revealed that while only 30% of the tweets 
about the Egyptian revolution in 2011 originated within Egypt, about 90% of all Gezi- related 
tweets had originated within Turkey.  
Therefore, I would like to do a more content-based analysis of these tweets from the first 
few weeks of the uprising to show how social media were utilized particularly for learning and 
adaptation to resist the police brutality and to avoid detention. More specifically, I would like to 
study how protestors used Twitter in real time, while they were protesting to share information 
about the police activity at specific streets, protestor friendly establishments, spaces that acted as 
temporary infirmaries, and for legal help. 
7.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
During one of the presidential debates for the 2008 presidential elections, the moderator 
asked whether Martin Luther King Jr. would support any of the candidates if he was still alive. 
Obama responded Martin Luther King Jr. would not support either candidate; he would be busy 
on the streets leading a social movement.  
Most rights we take for granted today such as equal voting rights, basic rights at the work 
place, are the results of years long, organized struggles of determined men and women. Yet, we 
still have much to learn why certain movements succeed, while others don’t. It is certain that the 
91 http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/06/these-charts-show-how-
crucial-twitter-is-for-the-turkey-protesters/276798/ 
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alliance and mobilization networks matter to a great extent in shaping movement outcomes by 
facilitating/hindering coordination efforts, determining movement strategies, and affecting the 
level of commitment to a movement by its adherents.  
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APPENDIX A 
Questionnaire Used During the Semi-Structured Interviews with the Organizations 
 
History  
(1) When was your organization established?  
(2) What are the main goals of your organizations? 
 
Organizational Structure 
(1) How many employees do you have? How many of them are paid? 
(2) Do you have membership system? Can you explain how does it work? 
(3) What are the main sources of for financing your operations? 
 
Activities 
(1) Can you explain your main activities/projects?  
(2) Who do you target as your main beneficiaries?  
(3) Can you name at least five organizations that you consider allies? 
(4) Can you name at least five organizations that you work together? 
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Ankara Related Work 
 
(1) Think about the major urban movements/campaigns that centered on Ankara 
related issues since 2006. Among these, which ones your organization was 
involved in? 
(2) For each campaign/movement you had participated since 2006 can you name the 
organizations that you collaborated with?  
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